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Professional Speech at Scale
Cassandra Burke Robertson†* and Sharona Hoffman**
Regulatory actions affecting professional speech are facing new
challenges from all directions. On one side, the Supreme Court has grown
increasingly protective of professionals’ free speech rights, and it has
subjected regulations affecting that speech to heightened levels of scrutiny
that call into question traditional regulatory practices in both law and
medicine. On the other side, technological developments, including the
growth of massive digital platforms and the introduction of artificial
intelligence programs, have created brand new problems of regulatory
scale. Professional speech is now able to reach a wide audience faster than
ever before, creating risks that misinformation will cause public harm long
before regulatory processes can gear up to address it.
This Article examines how these two trends interact in the fields of healthcare regulation and legal practice. It looks at how these forces work together
both to create new regulatory problems and to shape the potential
government responses to those problems. It analyzes the Supreme Court’s
developing case law on professional speech and predicts how the Court’s
jurisprudence is likely to influence current legal challenges in law and
medicine. The Article further examines the regulatory challenges posed by
the change in scale generated by massive digital platforms and the
introduction of artificial intelligence. It concludes by recommending ways
in which government regulators can meet the new challenges posed by
technological development without infringing on constitutionally protected
speech. The crux of our proposal is that incremental change in the
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traditional state regulatory process is insufficient to meet the challenges
posed by technological developments. Instead, it is time to ask bigger
questions about the underlying goals and first principles of professional
regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Living in an era of massive digital platforms has significant
implications for professional speech. Mass communication used to be
the province of established media outlets — newspapers, television and
radio stations, and magazines. But the internet revolution made mass
communications available to the individual, and the growth of social
media, along with easier access to video production and distribution,
further facilitated communication.1 The growth of massive digital
platforms has had implications for regulation in general, and matters
historically falling into the areas of medical, legal, or other licensed
professional practice are no exception to that trend.
Doctors and lawyers can now communicate with large audiences;
their influence is no longer tied to one-on-one consultations.2
Moreover, individuals who lack professional training and licensing can
similarly communicate with large audiences about legal and medical
matters, sometimes spreading harmful misinformation. Finally,
technology enables lawyers and medical professionals to meet face-toface with clients and patients across state lines without the
inconvenience of travel. All of these new capabilities raise serious
questions about professional licensing.
The growth in online communication is accompanied by the Supreme
Court’s increasingly strong interest in, and protection of, commercial
1

See Paul Ohm, Regulating at Scale, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 546, 549 (2018).
See infra Parts III.A.3, III.B.2; see also Carl H. Coleman, Physicians Who
Disseminate Medical Misinformation: Testing the Constitutional Limits on Professional
Disciplinary Action, FIRST AM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 3-9)
(discussing the dissemination of medical misinformation).
2
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and professional speech.3 In a 2018 case, the Court held that
professional speech was not categorically different from any other type
of speech.4 This means that going forward, most restrictions on
professional speech will be analyzed in the same manner as restrictions
on non-professionals’ speech — that is, the speech limitations will
typically fall under strict scrutiny, the hardest standard to satisfy.
Scholars have warned that such a ruling would significantly restrict
states’ long-standing authority to engage in professional regulation —
and that such restrictions could have far-ranging consequences in areas
such as law and medicine.5
This Article examines how professional regulation will change given
both increasing judicial scrutiny and new technological capabilities. It
re-envisions how professional regulation can adapt to the change in
regulatory scale and, at the same time, meet the Supreme Court’s
increasingly high bar for speech limitations. Part I begins with an
3 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer
“Right to Know,” 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 431 (2016) (noting that the Supreme Court has
signaled interest in adopting more robust protections for commercial speech); Jonathan
H. Adler, Persistent Threats to Commercial Speech, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 289, 289 (2016) (“Free
speech may be under fire in America today, but not at One First Street.”); Jane R.
Bambauer, Snake Oil Speech, 93 WASH. L. REV. 73, 77 (2018) (“[T]he quiet chaos of the
falsity doctrine has started to break out into noisy protests, both from corporate and
commercial speakers and from public outcry against ‘fake news.’”); Clay Calvert, Is
Everything a Full-Blown First Amendment Case After Becerra and Janus? Sorting Out
Standards of Scrutiny and Untangling “Speech as Speech” Cases from Disputes Incidentally
Affecting Expression, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 73, 138 (“Regardless of which side is right,
today’s conflict over scrutiny and what constitutes a true speech-as-speech case meriting
heightened review leaves First Amendment jurisprudence in even greater disarray than
it was before.”); Andra Lim, Note, Limiting NIFLA, 72 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (2020)
(“The tide has turned in recent years. Lawsuits raising First Amendment claims have
thrown into question the constitutional status of commercial warnings and
disclosures.”).
4 Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (“NIFLA”) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371
(2018).
5 See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First Amendment and the FDA: Toward
a More Democratic Political Economy, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 179, 193-94 (2018)
(“These cases pose significant risks to public health, whether from more extensive (and
less well-understood) off-label uses of drugs or more extensive (and less wellunderstood) uses of electronic and conventional cigarettes.”); Robert Post & Amanda
Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 171 n.41 (2015)
(questioning whether the Supreme Court’s increased protection of First Amendment
rights means that “those who engage in ‘occupational speech,’ like lawyers and doctors,
have an equivalent right to engage in deliberately false speech”); William French, Note,
This Isn’t Lochner, It’s the First Amendment: Reorienting the Right to Contract and
Commercial Speech, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 471 (2019) (“[Critics fear that] as soon as
the First Amendment wholly protects commercial speech, economic legislation as the
country knows it will crumble.”).
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analysis of the Supreme Court’s new landscape for regulations affecting
speech. It examines the constitutional law of professional speech,
analyzing how the Court has increasingly protected the speech rights of
professionals. Part II extends the speech analysis further into the
particular contexts of law and health care, analyzing how current
controversies in professional regulation will be affected by the Supreme
Court’s higher bar for speech protection and examining how far the
state can go in regulating the provision of legal and medical advice.
Part III moves to the particular regulatory challenges posed by the
change in scale generated by both massive digital platforms and artificial
intelligence. We often think of the doctor-patient and lawyer-client
relationships as existing within a professional dyad. But what happens
when lawyers and doctors can reach much larger audiences online, and
what happens when professionals take a back seat to algorithms? This
Part examines regulations on telemedicine and technology-assisted
legal practice as well as pressure to enable cross-border practice in both
law and medicine.
Finally, the Conclusion brings these issues together to discuss
recommendations for how the regulatory landscape should integrate
technological innovations at the same time as it backs away from relying
on direct regulation of technological speech. Although technology went
through a period of extremely rapid change in capability at the turn of
the millennium, both law and medicine were slow to catch up. The
COVID-19 pandemic swept away prior resistance to change in law and
medicine. When public health and fundamental justice were on the line,
institutions quickly adapted to encourage virtual medical visits and
even online jury trials. The pandemic will end, but the regulatory
structure of both law and medicine are unlikely to return to their prior
status. This Article concludes with an analysis of how professional
regulation can be re-imagined in the modern era to improve the
reliability of legal and medical information while maintaining an
environment of robust and open communication.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT’S GROWING SKEPTICISM OF SPEECH
LIMITATIONS

One of the Roberts Court’s most notable jurisprudential
developments has been its robust protection of First Amendment rights.
The Roberts Court has been described as “the most free speechprotective Supreme Court in memory.”6 This protection is especially
6 Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First Amendment, 25
J.L. & POL’Y 63, 64 (2016).
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apparent when regulatory efforts clash with free-speech claims. In
recent years, free speech advocates have generally prevailed against
speech-limiting regulatory efforts in diverse areas.7
Whether this heightened protection is a good thing or a bad thing
depends on one’s perspective.8 Supporters applaud the Court’s
protection of civil liberties.9 Critics, on the other hand, charge that the
Court “has turned the constitutional protection for free speech into a
tool with which to blow holes in the regulatory state.”10
Traditional regulatory regimes for law and medicine, after all, regulate
speech in many ways. Regulatory regimes determine who can speak —
that is, who is authorized to offer legal or medical advice. They may also
determine to whom professionals can speak — for example, whether
licensed professionals may offer services online to out-of-state clients.
They may determine how professionals speak, especially how they
structure their businesses — that is, can they partner with individuals
outside their profession? Can they be employed by a business entity
funded by outside investors?
This Part examines the likely impact of the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence on professional regulation. It first examines the
regulatory landscape within the legal profession and explains how freespeech claims fit into that landscape. Next, it turns to health care,
examining how free-speech challenges intersect with traditional
regulatory authority over medical professionals. Finally, it explores the
Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence touching on professional
regulation,11 including a greater emphasis on free-speech rights in the
7 See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2448 (2018) (striking down public union agency fees); NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(striking down disclosure requirements for crisis pregnancy centers); Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (striking down state restrictions on the sale of
prescription data); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(striking down campaign finance restrictions).
8 See Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1241, 1253-54 (2020) (“[Critics’ problem with the Supreme Court’s heightened
speech protection] was not that it illegitimately sought to vindicate unenumerated
rights, employed overly vague rules of decision, or failed to take adequate account of
economic inequality. What they meant instead was that the Court failed to show
adequate deference to the policy judgments of democratically elected legislatures.”).
9 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment in the Era of President Trump, 94
DENV. L. REV. 553, 557 (2017) (“[T]he Roberts Court has been very protective of speech
[by] expanding who is protected by the First Amendment’s safeguarding of
expression.”).
10 Enrique Armijo, Faint-Hearted First Amendment Lochnerism, 100 B.U. L. REV.
1377, 1380 (2020).
11 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371-75.
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professional sphere as well as increasing skepticism of professional
practices that inhibit economic competition.12 It analyzes arguments
that the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence undermines regulatory
authority in these areas, questioning how far the Court’s current
jurisprudence might go in limiting traditional areas of regulatory
authority over both lawyers and medical practitioners.
A. Protecting Professionals’ Commercial Speech
Until recently, there were few cases exploring the tension between
professional regulation and free-speech jurisprudence.13 Law and
medicine, as two of the earliest recognized professions, have long been
regulated at the state level through the licensing of professionals.14 In
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the story was
one of regulatory growth: during that period, states adopted licensing
and regulatory regimes for many professions and occupations, often
based on the earlier model originally developed for law and for
medicine.15 And although the Supreme Court struck down some of
these early regulatory efforts, most notably in its Lochner decision,16 the
Court shifted gears in 1937 and subsequently upheld state regulatory
efforts under a highly deferential “rational basis” standard.17
It was not until several decades after the end of the Lochner era that
the Supreme Court began striking down regulatory actions on freespeech grounds.18 These early cases tended to focus on marketing
activities, protecting the rights of labor-union lawyers to offer

12 See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015)
(emphasizing the fundamental values of free enterprise and competition as applied to a
state policy).
13 Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F.
183, 184 (2015) (“The protection available to occupational speech ‘is one of the least
developed areas of First Amendment doctrine.’”).
14 See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who
Should Control Lawyer Regulation — Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV.
1167, 1172 (2003); James N. Thompson & Lisa A Robin, State Medical Boards, 33 J.
LEGAL MED. 93, 93 (2012).
15 See id. at 1173.
16 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937); Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 495 (2004) (examining “the ‘mixed bag’
of rational basis cases decided following the Lochner era’s demise”).
18 See Nick Robinson, The Multiple Justifications of Occupational Licensing, 93 WASH.
L. REV. 1903, 1950 (2018).
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representation to injured workers19 and striking down advertising
prohibitions on pharmacies20 and lawyers.21 The Court gave the greatest
protection to speech rights in cases in which “political expression” was
at issue — thus protecting the rights of the NAACP and the ACLU to
seek clients in high-profile civil-rights litigation.22
When marketing activities arose from a desire for payment rather
than a desire to effect political change, the Court still offered some
protection, though at a lower level of scrutiny. Applying intermediate
scrutiny to commercial speech allowed the Court to uphold some
restrictions, such as limitations on direct personal solicitation of
clients.23 In upholding the restriction, the Court noted that the
“procurement of remunerative employment is . . . only marginally
affected with First Amendment concerns,” and that it “falls within the
State’s proper sphere of economic and professional regulation.”24
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has suggested that it
may be backing away from its prior dicta that appeared to devalue
commercial speech.25 In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., pharmaceutical
companies challenged a Vermont restriction that barred the sale of
doctors’ prescription data for marketing purposes, although it allowed
the data to be shared for non-commercial uses.26 Vermont argued that
the prohibition regulated conduct, rather than speech, and it asserted
that even if the prohibition did limit speech, the state had an interest in
protecting doctors’ privacy that was sufficient to justify a restriction on
commercial speech.27 The Supreme Court disagreed with the state’s
position and struck down the prohibition.28 It explained that “[t]he
19 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8
(1964).
20 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
21 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383-85 (1977).
22 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434 (1978) (“Where political expression or
association is at issue, this Court has not tolerated the degree of imprecision that often
characterizes government regulation of the conduct of commercial affairs.”); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (“In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not
a technique of resolving private differences [but is rather] a form of political
expression.”).
23 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
24 Id. at 459.
25 See Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 198 (“[T]he
Supreme Court arguably cast a shadow on commercial speech’s lower-value status in
Sorrell.”).
26 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 558-61 (2011).
27 Id. at 572.
28 Id. at 579.
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commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural
life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish” and that it
was up to “the speaker and the audience, not the government” to assess
the value of that information.29 The Court suggested that commercial
speech restrictions could be supported when necessary to combat false
or misleading advertising and related marketplace harms but that a state
may not impose regulatory restrictions that burden commercial speech
when the state’s goal is “to tilt public debate in a preferred direction.”30
B. Protecting the Content of Professional Speech
The Supreme Court’s early cases largely examined how professionals
attracted business — they did not touch on the scope of professional
speech or regulation once that professional relationship had been
established. In fact, the Court had been so deferential to state regulation
that many observers believed that professional speech was
“categorically exempted” from First Amendment scrutiny once a
“personal nexus between professional and client” had been
established.31
The “personal nexus” concept came from a concurrence by Justice
White in Lowe v. Securities Exchange but was never adopted by the
Supreme Court itself.32 The case arose when the SEC sought to restrain
an individual who was not a registered securities advisor from
publishing newsletters that offered investment advice.33 Because the
Supreme Court held that the SEC’s enabling act exempted the
newsletter from regulation, it did not have to decide whether the First
Amendment would have protected the newsletter writer.34 Justice
White’s concurrence, however, delved into the First Amendment
principles, concluding that it was necessary “to locate the point where
regulation of a profession leaves off and prohibitions on speech
begin.”35 Justice White drew the line between advising individual clients
and offering general advice to the public at large — the former type of
speech, in his view, was subject to regulation as the speech was merely

29

Id.
Id. at 578-79.
31 Robinson, supra note 18, at 1930.
32 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring); see Sherman,
supra note 13, at 185-86.
33 Lowe, 472 U.S. at 181.
34 Id. at 211.
35 Id. at 232 (White, J., concurring).
30
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incidental to practicing a profession, but the latter was protected by the
First Amendment.36
Even though Justice White’s view was never adopted by a majority of
the Supreme Court, it influenced lower courts, who cited it often in
upholding speech restrictions incidental to professional regulation.37
Under the approach adopted by these lower courts, speech directed
generally at the public would be protected by heightened scrutiny under
the First Amendment, but speech within the confines of a licensed
professional-client relationship could be subject to content-neutral
regulation by the state under a rational-basis standard.38 Under this
view, for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a law that banned sexual
orientation change efforts therapy.39 The court reasoned that because
the law prohibited treatment, not discussions about treatment, it
regulated conduct and not speech.40 This speech/conduct distinction
follows from case law developed by district courts and adopted, in some
cases, by courts of appeals.41 According to the court, treatment
constitutes conduct even if it consists entirely of speech, as with
psychotherapy.42
The Supreme Court moved away from this deferential approach in
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra.43 The Court in
NIFLA faced a challenge to the Reproductive Freedom, Accountability,
Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (“FACT Act”), which had
36

Id.
Sherman, supra note 13, at 186-87 (“[L]ower courts have generally found Justice
White’s test to be satisfied by the existence of any personal nexus between speaker and
listener.”).
38 See, e.g., Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 753 F.3d 560, 562 (2014) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to a licensing law that was justified without reference to the
content of speech).
39 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Nat’l Inst.
of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
40 Id. at 1229-30.
41 See Wynter K. Miller & Benjamin E. Berkman, The Future of Physicians’ First
Amendment Freedom: Professional Speech in an Era of Radically Expanded Prenatal Genetic
Testing, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 577, 653-54 (2019) (“The lower courts have repeatedly
approached the problem of identifying professional speech by attempting to
differentiate ‘medical conduct’ from physician speech.”).
42 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (“[A] regulation of only treatment itself—whether
physical medicine or mental health treatment—implicates free speech interests only
incidentally, if at all.”).
43 NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018); see Rodney A. Smolla,
Commercial Speech in Specific Contexts—Commercial Speech and Professional Services—
Regulation of ‘Professional Speech’, in 2 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
§ 20:37.40 (2021) (“The Supreme Court largely obliterated the nascent professional
speech doctrine in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra.”).
37
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two disclosure requirements.44 First, it required pregnancy centers to
distribute or post a notice informing the public about California’s free
and low-cost reproductive health programs that provided services such
as contraception and abortions.45 Second, it required unlicensed centers
to distribute a notice stating that they were not licensed.46 A variety of
pregnancy centers challenged the notice as unconstitutional compelled
speech and sought a preliminary injunction against its enforcement.
In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court held
that both disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment. The
Court criticized decisions from the courts of appeals that “except[ed]
professional speech from the rule that content-based regulations of
speech are subject to strict scrutiny.”47 The Court explained that “this
Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate category of
speech.”48 It stated that professional speech was afforded less protection
than other speech only in “two circumstances”: first, when a law
requires professionals to disclose “factual, noncontroversial
information” about the services they provide and second, when a
regulation of conduct “incidentally involves” speech.49
The Court concluded that neither of those circumstances applied to
the California law.50 It explained that the notice about state-based lowcost health programs “in no way relates to the services that licensed
clinics provide,” but instead informed clients about other services
provided by the state.51 Furthermore, the requirement more than
“incidentally” involved speech — its very purpose was
communication.52
The disclosure of licensure status came closer to qualifying for
deferential treatment as a factual, noncontroversial statement about
services provided, but the Court concluded that even if the more
deferential standard applied, the disclosure requirement would still fail
for being unduly burdensome.53 The Court held that the state had the
burden of proof to establish that the licensing disclosure was “neither

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2369-70.
Id. at 2369.
Id. at 2369-70.
Id. at 2371.
Id.
Id. at 2372.
Id. at 2373, 2375.
Id. at 2372.
Id. at 2373-74.
Id. at 2378.
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unjustified nor unduly burdensome.”54 To do so, it would have to show
an alleged harm that is “potentially real and not purely hypothetical,”
and a disclosure requirement that extends “no broader than reasonably
necessary” to avoid “chilling protected speech.”55 The Court concluded
that the state had failed to establish more than hypothetical harms and
had failed to tailor the disclosure requirement, stating that the law
“targets speakers, not speech, and imposes an unduly burdensome
disclosure requirement that will chill their protected speech.”56
The Supreme Court’s NIFLA decision surprised many onlookers.
Constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky believed that it would
be easy for the Supreme Court to uphold the law.57 After all,
“traditionally, warnings and disclosures had not drawn constitutional
attacks.”58 The Court’s decision suggests that lower courts’
interpretation of law will need substantial rethinking. In particular, the
speech/conduct distinction is unlikely to play a dispositive role in future
cases, even when there is a “personal nexus” between a licensed
professional and an individual client or patient. As one scholar
explained, “although the Court has upheld regulations of professional
conduct that incidentally involved speech, it does not automatically
assume that regulations that apply to professionals are always
regulations of conduct.”59 He pointed out that the plaintiffs themselves
in NIFLA provided both advice and pregnancy-related medical services,
and that “[t]he mere fact that the plaintiffs were licensed professionals
did not render all of their advice regulable conduct.”60 Instead, the
Court recognized that the First Amendment protects the content of
licensed professionals’ speech.
C. Protecting the Marketplace Against Anti-Competitive Regulation
Along with protecting commercial and professional speech, the
Supreme Court has recently limited the power of some licensing boards
to use their licensing power to control the speech of non-licensed
54

Id. at 2377.
Id. at 2377-78 (citations omitted).
56 Id. at 2378.
57 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: Ensuring Accurate Information for Patients
Does Not Violate the First Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 12, 2017, 1:35 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/12/symposium-ensuring-accurate-information-patientsnot-violate-first-amendment [https://perma.cc/YJ8F-LRNW].
58 Lim, supra note 3, at 129.
59 Michael E. Rosman, Is It Time to Revisit the Constitutionality of Unauthorized
Practice of Law Rules?, 20 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 74, 78 (2019).
60 Id.
55
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individuals. In North Carolina, the state dental board challenged
individuals who operated teeth-whitening kiosks in shopping malls,
alleging that they were practicing dentistry without a license.61 The
Federal Trade Commission filed an administrative complaint, arguing
that the board’s decision “constituted an anticompetitive and unfair
method of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act.”62
The board claimed immunity from antitrust regulation as a state entity,
and further argued that the state had delegated power to the board to
regulate matters affecting public safety.63
When the dispute reached the Supreme Court, the Court sided with
the FTC. It concluded that the dental board was not immune from
antitrust liability because it was controlled by “market participants.”64
The Court explained that a “nonsovereign actor controlled by active
market participants” would qualify for immunity only if it met two
requirements: first, that the restraint of trade “be one clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy,” and second, that it “be
actively supervised by the State.”65 The Court found that the policy of
prohibiting the unauthorized practice of dentistry was clearly
established, but that the inclusion of teeth-whitening as “dentistry” was
less clear. Nor was there any state involvement in the decision to
categorize teeth-whitening as dentistry — that decision was made by
the board, a majority of which consisted of practicing dentists.66 The
domination of the regulatory board by market participants, the Court
stated, created a “risk that active market participants will pursue private
interests in restraining trade.”67
Although the Supreme Court’s decision was not based expressly on a
free-speech rationale, the decision will still reshape state regulatory
authority of matters involving professional speech. A licensing regime,
after all, is a means of “essentially granting ‘speech monopolies’” to
those it licenses.68 Licensing practices identify a “class of speakers who
may engage in certain forms of communication,” thereby
“entrench[ing] the power of those speakers” in relation to those who
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N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 501 (2015).
Id.
63 Id. at 501-02; see also id. at 522 (Alito, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 503-04.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 499.
67 Id. at 510.
68 Robert Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”: Professional Licensing and the First
Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885, 974 (2000).
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lack such state-sanctioned authority.69 Thus, by limiting the power of
practitioner-dominated state boards to engage in protectionist activity,
the Supreme Court was protecting the free-speech rights of unlicensed
individuals.70 As with the Court’s other cases, however, the decision
meant that professional regulatory bodies would be given less
deference.
In some ways, this decision may risk undermining the goals of
professional regulation. Professor Claudia Haupt, who has written
extensively about professional speech, has argued that the professions
should be thought of as “knowledge communities.”71 She points out
that state regulations that limit or control the content of professional
speech may be more defensible if those restrictions depend on the
professional judgment of the American Medical Association or
equivalent entities.72 Increased participation of political entities, in her
view, “should result in a high degree of skepticism toward state
interference at odds with professional insights.”73
Even so, one of the likely results of the North Carolina Board of Dental
Examiners case is greater political oversight over state professional
boards. From the beginning, it was clear that the case would affect
professional regulation beyond dentistry. At oral argument, Justice
Breyer raised the question of whether a decision in favor of the FTC
could affect medical credentialing and expressed concern that
“neurologists, not non-physician state regulators,” be allowed “to
decide who can be a neurologist.”74 Although Justice Breyer ultimately
joined the majority decision, his concern was not unwarranted —
commentators have noted that “neurologists and other doctors are just
as capable of anticompetitive actions as are dentists.”75 The opinion
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Id.
See Armijo, supra note 10, at 1420-21 (“When the state has the power to revoke
an occupational license for a speech-related reason and the grounds for revocation are
subject to a lesser standard of constitutional review, the government grants itself the
speech-hostile . . . power to ban individuals from the occupations of their choice based
on what they say.”).
71 See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality Trap, 127
YALE L.J. F. 150, 171 (2017).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Eric M. Fraser, Argument Analysis: Court Wary of Immunity for Licensing Boards,
but What About Doctors?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 15, 2014, 12:29 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/argument-analysis-court-wary-of-immunity-forlicensing-boards-but-what-about-doctors/ [https://perma.cc/RGB8-9GG4].
75 Id.
70
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does not carve out an exception for regulations resting on specialized
medical knowledge.
The Dental Examiners opinion has influenced legal regulation as well.
LegalZoom, a company that helps customers “create their own legal
documents addressing a variety of routine legal matters” joined with
other legal services providers and law professors to file an amicus brief
in support of the FTC.76 LegalZoom explained that it had also “been
subject to anticompetitive actions taken by self- and financiallyinterested regulatory agencies controlled by private market participants
that have threatened to restrict the market choices available to
consumers,” including in the state of North Carolina. After the Supreme
Court ruled for the FTC, LegalZoom managed to reach a favorable
settlement with regulators.77
In the five years after the Supreme Court’s decision, there has been “a
wave of private action suits against various state occupational licensing
authorities . . . .”78 One of those cases involved a Texas restriction on
telemedicine treatment.79 The federal district court relied on the
Supreme Court’s Dental Examiners decision to conclude that the
plaintiffs had successfully set out a prima facie case showing that their
antitrust claim would likely succeed.80 The district court therefore
granted an injunction against the regulation.81 The state regulatory
board “later dropped its appeal, seemingly fearing that the circuit court
would rule that the regulation did not have state action immunity.”82
II.

PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH

The Court’s speech jurisprudence is new enough that it’s too soon to
tell just how far it will go in limiting regulation in traditional
76 Brief for Legalzoom.com, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015) (No. 13-534), 2014 WL
3895926, at *1.
77 Keith A. Call, Could Our “Ethics” Actually Be Illegal?, 29 UTAH B.J. 34, 34 (2016)
(noting that a suit filed in the wake of the Dental Examiners case “resulted in a consent
decree that allows LegalZoom to provide certain types of legal services in North
Carolina, subject to certain consumer protection measures”); Caroline Shipman, Note,
Unauthorized Practice of Law Claims Against LegalZoom – Who Do These Lawsuits Protect,
and is the Rule Outdated?, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 939, 947 (2019) (noting the North
Carolina Legislature also passed a bill setting parameters similar to those of the
settlement).
78 Robinson, supra note 18, at 1924.
79 Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 533 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
80 Id. at 540.
81 Id. at 544.
82 Robinson, supra note 18, at 1925.

2078

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:2063

professional spheres like law and medicine. But the Court’s recent
decisions raise significant questions that continue to spawn a great deal
of litigation likely to affect the regulatory landscape in both law and
medicine. This Part examines the most significant of those ongoing
challenges in law and health care and analyzes what the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence might mean for traditional regulatory actions in
these areas of professional practice.
A. The Free Speech Landscape in Legal Practice
At its core, the regulation of legal practice is the regulation of
speech.83 The practice of law, in fact, is only speech — while many
doctors may perform surgery or other physical procedures on patients,
lawyers do not. Historically, the regulation of legal practice has centered
on two areas.84 First is the question of who can speak — that is, how
does the state license individual practitioners and how does it stop nonlicensed individuals from encroaching on areas carved out for licensed
attorneys?85 The second area of regulatory tension relates to what can
be said, especially for the purpose of marketing legal services.86
The last twenty years have seen major change in some aspects of
lawyer regulation and growing frustration at the lack of change in other
areas. States have offered greater uniformity and reciprocity in
licensing, making law degrees more geographically portable than in
prior decades.87 At the same time, regulatory changes have failed to
improve access to legal services, creating growing dissatisfaction with
the unavailability of legal services to even middle-class individuals and
small businesses.88
83 See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1302-03 (2016)
(explaining that many professions, including law, accounting, and investment advising,
rely heavily on speech and that “[i]t is therefore all the more troubling that there has
not yet been a comprehensive theory of professional speech advanced in the courts and
the legal literature.”).
84 See Renee Newman Knake, Legal Information, the Consumer Law Market, and the
First Amendment, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2843, 2846 (2014) (“[P]rofessional conduct
regulations impede the free flow of legal information from lawyers.”).
85 See id. at 2846-47.
86 See id. at 2847-48.
87 Robert J. Derocher, Breaking Barriers: In a Changing Profession, What Is the Impact
of the Uniform Bar Examination?, AM. BAR ASS’N (2019), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/bar_services/publications/bar_leader/2019_20/september-october/breakingbarriers-in-a-changing-profession-what-is-the-impact-of-the-uniform-bar-examination
[https://perma.cc/K2L7-MZTF].
88 See generally Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook Disruption: How Social
Media May Transform Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75,
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A few states have voluntarily begun to experiment with loosening
regulatory structures to promote access to justice. The state of
Washington was one of the first to license non-lawyer professionals to
undertake some tasks historically reserved for lawyers, but the state
abandoned the program when costs appeared to outweigh the program’s
benefit.89 Other states have taken a much more radical approach. The
Utah Supreme Court adopted a “sandbox” program to allow entities to
“use new models for legal businesses and offer new kinds of legal
services to Utah’s public.”90 And Arizona has gone the furthest, enacting
a wholesale change in late August 2020 that “has gotten rid of two of
what many consider the main pillars of our professional independence:
the rule against fee-splitting with non-lawyers and the rule against paidfor recommendations.”91
Most of the states, however, continue to maintain traditional
regulatory structures. These states are increasingly facing legal
challenges, often based on free speech grounds.92 In recent years,
litigation has challenged licensing restrictions that prohibit non-lawyers
from offering legal advice, prohibitions on non-lawyer ownership of law
firms, and restrictions on marketing and commercial speech.

75-98 (2012) (applying the theory of disruptive innovation to Facebook and social
media’s impacts on legal services).
89 Lyle Moran, How the Washington Supreme Court’s LLLT Program Met Its Demise,
ABA J. (July 9, 2020, 1:46 PM CDT), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/howwashingtons-limited-license-legal-technician-program-met-its-demise [https://perma.cc/
S8BR-QMAD].
90 What We Do, THE OFF. OF LEGAL SERVS. INNOVATION, AN OFF. OF THE UTAH SUP.
CT., https://utahinnovationoffice.org/about/what-we-do (last visited Feb. 26, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/QPK6-G2DW].
91 Ron Minkoff, Arizona’s Sweeping Rule Changes Permit More Non-Lawyer
Involvement in Legal Services, FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN + SELZ PC (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://professionalresponsibility.fkks.com/post/102ge8x/arizonas-sweeping-rulechanges-permit-more-non-lawyer-involvement-in-legal-servi [https://perma.cc/74PHPREJ].
92 See, e.g., Renee Newman Knake, The Legal Monopoly, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1293,
1297-98 (2018) (noting that antitrust challenges to lawyer regulation have been
increasing and “are likely to recur”); Leslie C. Levin, The End of Mandatory State Bars?,
109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 2 (2020) (“Mandatory bars in several states are now defending
themselves against renewed claims that compelled dues and membership violate
lawyers’ First Amendment rights.”); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Private Ordering in the
Market for Professional Services, 94 B.U. L. REV. 179, 211 (2014) (discussing challenges
to corporate practice restrictions).
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Licensure

In general, states have taken a harder line on “unauthorized practice”
rules in law (known as “UPL”) than in medicine. In medicine, most
unauthorized practice prosecutions focus on individuals who falsely
hold themselves out to be licensed professionals. Although legal
practice also has such cases, there are also many cases involving
individuals who were honest about their status as non-lawyers.93 Before
the 1980s, there had been “surprisingly few constitutional challenges to
unauthorized practice prohibitions.”94 In fact, a study by Professor
Deborah Rhode identified only ten reported decisions considering First
Amendment claims at all.95
Some of the earliest free-speech challenges to lawyer regulation
occurred when state bars tried to limit assistance to individuals engaged
in self-help legal practice. Texas famously prosecuted a legal publisher
for printing forms intended to be used by pro se litigants.96 More
recently, state bars have gone after online service providers such as
LegalZoom.97 In recent years, the number of such challenges has grown
— though appellate courts have “uniformly rejected such challenges . . .
based on a wide variety of unconvincing rationales,” such as the idea
that nonlawyers’ legal advice is conduct rather than speech, or that if
legal advice is speech, it is merely “incidental” to conduct.98
Yet as the free-speech challenges in this area grow, courts are
increasingly having to grapple with questions about whether their
precedent is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent protection of
professional speech. Ohio case law offers a contemporary example of
this tension. Ohio has taken an explicitly “expansive” position in
Cincinnati B. Assn. v. Foreclosure Sols, which involved a complaint
against advisors who helped families try to avoid foreclosure on their

93 See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 33 (1981)
(finding that a minority of unauthorized practice claims “concerned laymen
fraudulently holding themselves out as attorneys”).
94 Id. at 44.
95 Id.
96 In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. 1999).
97 See Catherine J. Lanctot, Does LegalZoom Have First Amendment Rights?: Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Speech and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20 TEMP. POL.
& C.R. L. REV. 255, 257-61 (2011); Mathew Rotenberg, Note, Stifled Justice: The
Unauthorized Practice of Law and Internet Legal Resources, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709, 725
(2012).
98 Michele Cotton, Improving Access to Justice by Enforcing the Free Speech Clause,
83 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 113, 155 (2017).
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homes.99 In enjoining the conduct and imposing penalties on the
defendants, the court held that efforts to “advise [others] of their legal
rights,” can qualify as the unauthorized practice of law.100 Under the
court’s holding, it did not matter whether the advisors held themselves
out as attorneys; the court stated that “laypersons may not insulate
themselves . . . by simply informing customers facing foreclosure that
the layperson is not an attorney and is, therefore, incapable of giving
legal advice.”101 Unfortunately, this Ohio case did not grapple directly
with potential First Amendment defenses to the UPL claim; the issue
may not have been raised by the defendants. The Ohio Attorney General
did file an amicus brief urging the court to adopt a “carefully crafted”
definition of the practice of law, warning the court that an overly broad
standard could “easily, although inadvertently, sweep into their ambit
the many legitimate housing counselors who provide vital and valuable
loss-mitigation and foreclosure prevention counseling in Ohio.”102
While that case didn’t directly address free-speech claims, two justices
on the Ohio Supreme Court have signaled a willingness to reconsider
the court’s earlier precedents on First Amendment grounds. Justice
Patrick DeWine, joined by Justice Sharon Kennedy, dissented when the
Ohio Supreme Court upheld a UPL charge based on an individual’s
action taken to help a church avoid foreclosure.103 The facts show that
the individual had taken three actions on behalf of the church: he (1)
“advised the church to try to ‘find a solution before [the matter got] out
of hand’ and suggested that it ‘try to raise the needed funds’ and accept
a settlement offer from PNC Bank,” (2) he “apparently indicated to the
bank’s attorney that the bank should ‘mediate’ rather than litigate the
dispute,” and (3) he “may have expressed to the bank’s attorney that he
didn’t believe that the church should owe on the debt.”104 None of this
advice was clearly wrong, and the defendant had never purported to be
acting as an attorney. Even so, the court found this evidence strong
enough to support a $1,000 fine and an injunction against further
action.

99 Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Foreclosure Sols., 914 N.E.2d 386, 389 (Ohio 2009) (“We
have defined the practice of law expansively.”).
100 Id. at 390.
101 Id.
102 Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray in Support of
Neither Party, Cincinnati Bar Ass’n, 914 N.E.2d 386 (No. 2009-0967), 2009 WL
1939104, at *3 (Ohio 2009).
103 Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Watkins Glob. Network, 150 N.E.3d 68, 80 (Ohio 2020)
(DeWine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104 Id. at 78.
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In his dissent, Justice DeWine wrote that “merely expressing an
opinion with legal implications is not the practice of law,” and that “a
corollary of the principle that one doesn’t violate our rules merely by
voicing an opinion with legal implications is that one doesn’t violate our
rules just because one offers such an opinion in the course of providing
another service to a client.”105 DeWine pointed to the Supreme Court’s
decision in NIFLA to explain that “[o]ur authority to regulate the
practice of law is further limited by the associational and free-speech
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”106 Justice DeWine also noted that “the Ohio State Bar
Association, a professional association of lawyers, is acting as the
prosecutor in this case” and cited the Dental Examiners case for the
proposition that the Supreme Court had recently held that regulatory
schemes relying on “active market participants” may violate antitrust
law.107
2.

Outside Investment in Law Practice

Most states retain restrictions on the “corporate practice of law” —
that is, allowing nonlawyers to invest in law practices or to own law
firms. Professor Renee Knake Jefferson has argued that corporate
practice restrictions violate the First Amendment. She asserts that
“commercial speech about the delivery of legal services is inherently
political speech, speech that goes to the heart of meaningful access to
the law, speech deserving of the strongest protection that the
Constitution offers.”108 She therefore believes that bans on external
investment necessarily “function as content regulation that suppresses
ideas.”109 The law firm of Jacoby and Meyers, LLP has made similar
arguments challenging the corporate practice doctrine in court; it sued
in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, arguing that the ban on
investment violates the firm’s constitutional rights.110 The law firm lost
its challenges in New York and Connecticut and voluntarily dismissed

105

Id. at 78, 80.
Id. at 79 (citing NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371-72 (2018)).
107 Id.
108 Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 36 (2012).
109 Id.
110 Robertson, supra note 92, at 190.
106
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its New Jersey case.111 Even so, the underlying constitutional issues are
likely to be picked up by others making similar claims in the future.
3.

Marketing and Commercial Speech

Protection for commercial speech continues to be a source of tension
in legal regulation. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which form the basis of most states’ rules, now prohibit only “false or
misleading communication” in advertising claims.112 Even under the
more relaxed modern regulatory scheme, however, there is plenty of
room for disagreement about the allowable scope of attorney speech.
For example, states may take a hard line in defining what is
“misleading.” In one recent case, an advertisement was held to be
misleading when it “featured a relatively comic and innocuous fictional
vignette in which an insurance company is depicted as capitulating and
settling its case upon learning the identity of the plaintiff’s personal
injury firm.”113 Of course, there is room for judicial interpretation in
deciding what constitutes a “misleading” communication. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA suggests that restrictive
decisions are vulnerable if they rely merely on “hypothetical” harms.114
Without evidence that a reasonable client is likely to be misled by such
an advertisement, the prohibition should fail.
Attorney speech that falls in the gray area between “commercial” and
“political” speech is sometimes subject to challenge. The Virginia
Supreme Court was sharply divided when one attorney was charged
with a disciplinary violation for failing to label his blog posts, which
discussed criminal justice issues, as “advertisements.”115 Ultimately the
court upheld the labeling requirement, concluding that the attorney
used his blog as a way to generate client interest and that the state could
therefore compel him to label the posts.116 Two dissenting justices,
111 Mark Dubois, Jacoby & Meyers Case–Not Only Unsuccessful but Moot, Too, CONN.
L. TRIB. (March 27, 2017 10:28 AM), https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/almID/
1202782122721/Jacoby-amp-Meyers-CasemdashNot-Only-Unsuccessful-but-MootToo/?slreturn=20220126234834 [https://perma.cc/N2H7-DD9J]; Charles Toutant,
Jacoby & Meyers Drops Bid for Nonlawyer Equity Stake, N.J. L.J. (July 29, 2014, 1:50
PM), https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/almID/1202665088009/jacoby-meyers-dropsbid-for-nonlawyer-equity-stake [https://perma.cc/7G8E-SUS5].
112 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 7.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
113 Rodney A. Smolla, The Puffery of Lawyers, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (2002).
114 NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018).
115 Hunter v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611, 620 (Va. 2013).
116 Id. at 620-21 (“Hunter’s blogs are commercial speech and, thus, constitute lawyer
advertising.”).
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however, would have held differently; they argued that “[w]hen
commercial and political elements are intertwined in speech, the
heightened scrutiny test must apply to all of the speech.”117 The case
was decided several years before the Supreme Court’s NIFLA decision,
and if the situation arose now, the attorney’s case against compelled
disclosure would be even stronger.
B. The Free Speech Landscape in Health Care
In many ways, medicine is regulated far more extensively than law.118
For example, while plaintiffs can litigate pro se,119 patients cannot write
their own prescriptions.120 Whereas legal practice is largely selfregulated, the practice of medicine is subject to constraints imposed by
both state and federal legislatures and administrative agencies.121 The
plethora of health care regulations have generated a profusion of
litigation, including First Amendment free speech claims.122 The
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Id. at 623 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
See Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal
Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 461-65 (2008) (arguing that lawyers are the only selfregulated profession and are therefore less regulated than other professions, like
medicine, because those professions are subject to control by legislatures whereas the
legal profession answers to, and is regulated by, itself); Herbert M. Kritzer, The
Professions are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World,
33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 713, 714-15 (1999) (discussing the change in the medical profession
from self-regulation to corporate and institutional regulation and comparing it to the
legal profession which still functions as a self-regulated profession and is therefore less
regulated than the medical industry).
119 E.g., Representing Yourself, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF MASS.,
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/general/prose-litigants.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/YL45-K5MM].
120 E.g., Who Can Prescribe and Administer Prescriptions in Washington State, WASH.
STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.doh.wa.gov/LicensesPermitsandCertificates/
ProfessionsNewReneworUpdate/PharmacyCommission/WhoCanPrescribeandAdminis
terPrescriptions (last visited Jan. 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8KBW-8JWT].
121 See Barton, supra note 118, at 461-65; Key Regulations Affecting a Physician’s
Practice, MEDSCAPE, https://www.medscape.com/courses/section/870050 (last visited
Jan. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/UN26-9LK3] (“Healthcare is one of the most regulated
industries in the United States . . . . [the] list of regulations and acts that affect the
management of a physician’s office is daunting.”).
122 See generally Jessica Clara Schidlow, Prescribing Politics: A Call for Stronger First
Amendment Protection of Physician-Patient Communications from State Interference in the
Practice of Medicine, 11 NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.natlawreview.
com/article/prescribing-politics-call-stronger-first-amendment-protection-physicianpatient [https://perma.cc/D2ZJ-APWN] (offering insight into how physician speech is
regulated and the extent to which it is protected by the First Amendment in the context
of specific types of laws, such as abortion consent laws).
118
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number and variety of such claims in medicine far exceed the scope of
litigation over professional speech in the legal field.
While the Supreme Court has consistently trended towards favoring
free speech rights, the lower courts have been less consistent in health
care professional conduct cases. Predictions are especially difficult to
make when litigation is driven by political agendas, such as a desire to
impede abortions or medical marijuana.123 Below is a sampling of cases
in which medical professionals have asserted freedom of speech claims.
1.

Licensure

Like lawyers, health care professionals generally must have
appropriate licenses from each state in which they practice.124 Licensing
requirements have generated several lawsuits.
To illustrate, in Hines v. Quillivan,125 a veterinarian alleged that a
Texas statute that prohibited the practice of veterinary medicine absent
a valid veterinarian-client-patient relationship, which could not be
established solely by phone, violated his First (and Fourteenth)
Amendment rights.126 The district court found that the law was contentneutral and ruled against Dr. Hines.127 However, the Fifth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case in light of NIFLA and related cases,
instructing the district court to assess whether the statute regulated
conduct or speech.128
In Rosemond v. Markham, the author of a long-running newspaper
parenting advice column sought declaratory and injunctive relief,
alleging that the Kentucky Board of Examiners of Psychology’s effort to
123 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L.
REV. 739, 763 (2018) (explaining that both the country and the judiciary have grown
increasingly politically polarized, but noting that “political bias is especially hard to pin
down” in judicial rulings when there is no clear line between judicial ideology and
interpretation).
124 Bob Kocher, Doctors Without State Borders: Practicing Across State Lines, HEALTH
AFFS. BLOG (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20140218.
036973/full [https://perma.cc/52WJ-GZNG]; see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 4731.41(A)
(2022) (“No person shall practice medicine and surgery, or any of its branches, without
the appropriate license or certificate from the state medical board to engage in the
practice.”); Healthcare Professional Credentialing Requirements: License Requirements,
WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, https://www.doh.wa.gov/LicensesPermitsand
Certificates/ProfessionsNewReneworUpdate/HealthcareProfessionalCredentialingRequ
irements (last visited July 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7PXA-XQVB].
125 395 F. Supp. 3d 857 (S.D. Tex. 2019).
126 Id. at 860.
127 Id. at 864-66.
128 Hines v. Quillivan, 982 F.3d 266, 272 (5th Cir. 2020).
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prohibit him from calling himself as a “family psychologist” violated his
First Amendment free speech rights.129 The court held that the Board’s
attempted regulation of the plaintiff’s tagline at the bottom of his advice
column was a content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny, which
it did not survive.130 More specifically, the court asserted:
Rosemond is entitled to express his views and the fact that he is
not a Kentucky-licensed psychologist does not change that fact.
If the facts were different, had Rosemond represented himself
to be a Kentucky-licensed psychologist or had he actually
entered into a client-patient relationship in Kentucky, the
outcome might be different.131
This outcome is markedly different from that of Cincinnati B. Assn. v.
Foreclosure Sols, discussed above.132 Faced with similar claims related
to legal advice, an Ohio court prohibited nonlawyers from helping
families facing foreclosure and imposed penalties on them for doing so.
A Georgia licensing case involved the regulation of midwifery.133
Deborah Pulley, who worked as a certified professional midwife for
forty years and delivered over one-thousand babies, asserted that a
Georgia statute prohibiting individuals from calling themselves
midwives unless they had a nursing degree violated her free speech
rights.134 The case quickly settled, and the state agreed not to pursue
cases against midwives such as Ms. Pulley in the future.135

129

Rosemond v. Markham, 135 F. Supp. 3d 574, 578 (E.D. Ky. 2015).
Id. at 586, 589.
131 Id. at 589.
132 See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
133 Jim Manley & Caleb Trotter, Call the Midwife — but Not If You Live in Georgia,
HILL (Dec. 16, 2019, 7:00 AM EST), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/474216-callthe-midwife-but-not-if-you-live-in-georgia [https://perma.cc/88H7-L5YR].
134 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, 9-10, Pulley v. Izlar, No.
19-cv-05574 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2019), https://pacificlegal.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/12/Debbie-Pulley-v.-Janice-Izlar-Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UHN-BBR8];
Manley & Trotter, supra note 133.
135 Consent Order and Final Judgment at 2, Pulley v. Thompson, No. 19-cv-05574-AT
(N.D. Ga. July 8, 2020), https://pacificlegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Pulley-v.Thompson-Consent-Order-Final-Judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/87MR-DRLV] (“Defendant
agrees that the Board will only pursue cases involving the unlicensed practice of nursing
(including midwifery) in Georgia for cases involving unlicensed individuals unlawfully
practicing midwifery or holding themselves out to the public as being able to practice
nursing (midwifery) lawfully in the State of Georgia.”).
130
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Compelled Speech and Forbidden Topics

Many professional speech cases have arisen in health care because
states attempted to force practitioners to make certain statements or
prohibited them from engaging in particular forms of speech. Below are
a number of examples.
a.

Conversion Therapy

Twenty states have passed laws prohibiting therapists from practicing
conversion therapy136 on gay minors.137 When opponents challenged
those laws in the Third Circuit and Ninth Circuits before NIFLA, the
courts upheld the legislation.138 The Third Circuit applied intermediate
scrutiny and reasoned that the law was defensible under the First
Amendment because it advanced the state’s interest of protecting
children from harm.139 The Ninth Circuit upheld the conversion
therapy ban under a rational basis analysis, reasoning that the law
pertained to medical conduct rather than speech.140 Notably, in a recent
post-NIFLA decision, the Eleventh Circuit subjected a conversion
therapy ban to strict scrutiny as a content-based regulation and found
that it violated the First Amendment.141

136 Conversion therapy aims to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender
identity, and many consider it to be discredited and harmful. See So-Called “Conversion
Therapy” and LGBTQ Youth Mental Health, TREVOR PROJECT (Aug. 27, 2021),
https://www.thetrevorproject.org/resources/guide/so-called-conversion-therapy-andthe-lgbtq-youth-mental-health/ [https://perma.cc/DSV3-93GT].
137 Conversion Therapy Laws, FAM. EQUAL., https://www.familyequality.org/
resources/conversion-therapy-laws (last visited July 14, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JC42LL3G].
138 King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 246 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that SCOTUS
has not recognized “professional speech” as a separate category of speech and stating
that speech is not unprotected by the First Amendment just because it is spoken by
professionals), overruled in part by NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Pickup v.
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1236 (9th Cir. 2014).
139 King, 767 F.3d at 237-39.
140 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1230.
141 Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 867-68, 872 (11th Cir. 2020). But see
Doyle v. Hogan, 411 F. Supp. 3d 337, 344-48 (D. Md. 2019) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to uphold Maryland’s statutory ban of conversion therapy and dismiss a
practitioner’s First Amendment claim).
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Medical Marijuana

Medical marijuana is legal in many states,142 but doctors who
prescribe it or advise patients to use it may risk disciplinary action by
federal authorities, arguably in contravention of their free speech
rights.143 The Ninth Circuit considered a federal policy that established
in relevant part that a doctor’s recommendation of medical marijuana
would lead to revocation of his or her registration to prescribe
controlled substances.144 The court found that the content-based
restriction impermissibly interfered with the free speech rights of
physicians.145 By contrast, at least one district court held that the First
Amendment does not protect physician speech surrounding the
prescription and recommendation of medicinal marijuana.146
c.

Gun Possession

In Florida, physicians and medical organizations challenged a law
that barred doctors and other medical professionals from asking about
firearm ownership or entering details regarding firearm ownership in a
patient’s medical chart.147 The Eleventh Circuit found that the contentbased law failed to withstand both intermediate and strict scrutiny and
thus violated plaintiffs’ free speech rights.148

142 See Map of Marijuana Legality by State, DISA, https://disa.com/map-of-marijuanalegality-by-state (last updated Dec. 2021) [https://perma.cc/KWH7-NH9T].
143 Joseph Gregorio, Physicians, Medical Marijuana, and the Law, 16 AMA J. ETHICS
732, 733 (2014); MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, “PRESCRIBING” VERSUS “RECOMMENDING”
MEDICAL CANNABIS, https://www.mpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Prescribing-vs.Recommending.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2021) [https://perma.cc/VX7L-LR7A].
144 Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002).
145 Id. at 639.
146 See Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that
the “First Amendment does not prohibit the federal government from taking action
against physicians whose prescription or recommendation of medicinal marijuana
violates” the Controlled Substance Act).
147 Firearms Owners’ Privacy Act (“FOPA”), FLA. STAT. §§ 790.338, 456.072,
395.1055, 381.026 (2011); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1300-03
(11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
148 Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1311 (“Because these provisions fail to satisfy
heightened scrutiny under Sorrell, they obviously would not withstand strict
scrutiny.”).
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Abortion

Not surprisingly, some of the most vigorous First Amendment battles
relate to speech about reproductive rights.149 Likely because of the
politically charged nature of these cases, court decisions show no
consistent pattern.
For example, in recent years, Arkansas,150 Idaho,151 Kentucky,152
North Dakota,153 South Dakota,154 Oklahoma,155 Nebraska,156 and
Utah157 passed laws requiring physicians to tell women that medication
abortions (using pills) can be reversed even though this claim is not
supported by scientific evidence.158 Courts have temporarily enjoined
enforcement of the laws in North Dakota and Oklahoma.159
Other states (fourteen in total) enacted laws mandating that clinicians
conduct ultrasounds before performing abortions.160 Kentucky’s law,161
requiring that doctors perform an ultrasound and show and describe
fetal images to a woman prior to an abortion, has been vigorously
149 See B. Jessie Hill, The Geography of Abortion Rights, 109 GEO. L.J. 1081, 1083
(2021) (“Enormous public attention has focused on the total or near-total abortion bans
passed by numerous states in recent years.”); Sonia M. Suter, Reproductive Technologies
and Free Speech, 49 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 514, 514 (2021) (“The nature of First
Amendment protection for speech in the context of the doctor-patient relationship has
been the subject of inquiry for several decades. The Supreme Court has only addressed
the issue three times — and each instance involved regulation of speech involving
reproductive care.”).
150 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1703(b)(9)(A) (2022).
151 IDAHO CODE § 18-609(2)(f) (2022).
152 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.774(2) (2022).
153 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(11)(b)(5) (2022).
154 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(h) (2022).
155 OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-756(B)(1) (2022).
156 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-327(1)(e) (2022).
157 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305.5(2)(u) (2022).
158 Anna North, Pregnant People are Being Offered an Unproven Treatment to “Reverse”
Abortions, VOX (Dec. 6, 2019, 11:09 AM EST), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/
11/11/20953337/abortion-pill-reversal-ohio-bill-law-pregnancy [https://perma.cc/8Y4RGMUF].
159 Am. Med. Ass’n v. Stenehjem, 412 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1152 (D.N.D. 2019)
(granting preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the state’s abortionreversal disclosure law); Tulsa Women’s Reprod. Clinic v. O’Connor, No. CV-20192176 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Oct. 1, 2021) (granting a temporary injunction preventing the
Oklahoma Attorney General from enforcing the state’s abortion-reversal disclosure
law).
160 Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/statepolicy/explore/requirements-ultrasound (last updated Nov. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
4H82-82AD].
161 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.727 (2020).
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litigated. A federal court of appeals upheld the law, and the Supreme
Court declined to hear the case.162
South Dakota requires physicians to tell patients, in writing and in
person, that among the known risks of abortion are an increased
likelihood of depression, suicidal ideation and suicide.163 Mississippi
and Texas mandate that doctors advise women that abortions are
associated with an increased risk of breast cancer.164 Although many
experts agree that no credible evidence supports any of these claims,165
the Eighth Circuit upheld South Dakota’s law.166
3.

FDA Regulation of Non-Clinicians

Not all First Amendment controversies involve health care clinicians.
Some have involved entities and professional activities that the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulates, and they merit brief
mention here.167 The FDA regulates drugs, medical devices, and
biological products.168 The scope of regulation includes matters of
professional speech, such as drug labeling and advertising.169

162 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 424 (6th Cir. 2019) cert.
denied, EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. v. Meier, 140 S. Ct. 655 (2019). The court
explained that: “Under the First Amendment, we will not highly scrutinize an informedconsent statute, including one involving informed consent to an abortion, so long as it
meets these three requirements: (1) it must relate to a medical procedure; (2) it must
be truthful and not misleading; and (3) it must be relevant to the patient’s decision
whether to undertake the procedure, which may include, in the abortion context,
information relevant to the woman’s health risks, as well as the impact on the unborn
life.”
Id. at 428-29.
163 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(e)(i)-(ii) (2016).
164 MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33(1)(a)(ii) (2017); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 171.012(a)(1)(B)(iii) (2015).
165 See, e.g., Sarah Kramer, Not Your Mouthpiece: Abortion, Ideology, and Compelled
Speech in Physician-Patient Relationships, 21 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 3-4 (2018)
(noting the absence of credible evidence that abortions lead to subsequent negative
psychological outcomes).
166 Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding no
First Amendment violation because a state could “require a physician to provide
truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an
abortion”).
167 See generally About FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda (last visited Jan. 2, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ZBA7-37DS] (offering additional
information about the FDA).
168 What
We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 28, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/8WW2-LNZG].
169 Kapczynski, supra note 5, at 180, 185-86.
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Physicians may prescribe drugs for purposes that the agency has not
approved, a practice known as off-label use.170 Traditionally, however,
the FDA has prohibited manufacturers from promoting their drugs for
off-label uses.171 Industry advocates have objected that this constraint
violates manufacturers’ First Amendment rights.172 Following in the
footsteps of Sorrell, at least a few courts have shown sympathy for this
argument.
In United States v. Caronia, the government prosecuted a drug
company detailer for promoting a drug approved for narcolepsy for offlabel uses, including restless leg syndrome, insomnia, and other
conditions.173 The Second Circuit ruled that prosecuting individuals for
off-label drug promotion violated their First Amendment rights, though
the FDA could still prohibit companies from making false and
misleading statements.174 Likewise, in Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, a
Southern District of New York judge granted a company preliminary
relief on First Amendment grounds, allowing it to market a drug called
Vascepa for off-label use.175
The FDA also regulates certain medical mobile applications and
digital services.176 One example is 23andMe, which analyzes customers’
genetic material (a saliva sample), and provides them with information
about their ancestry, health, and disease vulnerability.177 Such products
170 Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 724-25
(2017) [hereinafter Unprofessional].
171 ELIZABETH RICHARDSON, HEALTH AFFS., HEALTH POLICY BRIEF: OFF-LABEL DRUG
PROMOTION 1 (2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20160630.920075/
full/healthpolicybrief_159.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC2R-7NAN].
172 See id. at 4; Peter J. Henning, F.D.A.’s ‘Off-Label’ Drug Policy Leads to Free-Speech
Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/business/
dealbook/fdas-off-label-drug-policy-leads-to-free-speech-fight.html [https://perma.cc/
JU5G-9PVT].
173 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2012).
174 Id. at 160, 168.
175 Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 198
(S.D.N.Y 2015) (granting the company’s motion for a preliminary injunction and
declaring certain marketing statements were truthful and not misleading, despite the
FDA’s objections).
176 Device Software Functions Including Mobile Medical Applications, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/device-softwarefunctions-including-mobile-medical-applications (last updated Nov. 5, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/SQV8-UCXW].
177 Erika Check Hayden, The Rise, Fall and Rise Again of 23andMe, NATURE (Oct. 12,
2017), https://www.nature.com/news/the-rise-and-fall-and-rise-again-of-23andme-1.22801
[https://perma.cc/9HUH-NXSB]; DNA Insights Are an Essential Part of Your Health
Picture, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/?mkbanner=true (last visited Dec. 17,
2021) [https://perma.cc/7483-CV9A]; FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer
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are often called direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) tests.178 Critics posit that
regulation of medical digital services violates First Amendment free
speech rights.179 They believe that these services should not be regulated
because they simply process information or analyze data derived from
FDA-approved devices, such as gene sequencers.180 Free speech is at
issue because arguably such regulation unjustifiably impedes lawful
commercial speech and deprives consumers of wanted information.181
The FDA justifies its regulatory approach by explaining that it oversees
only DTC tests for “moderate to high risk medical purposes” that could
have a significant impact on medical care, assessing their analytical
validity, clinical validity, and the companies’ claims about them.182 The
courts have not yet had an opportunity to rule on a First Amendment
case involving DTC tests.
C. The Future of Free Speech and Professional Regulation
What does the Supreme Court’s skepticism of speech limitations
mean for legal and medical regulatory activity in the future? In order to
consider how best to respond to the regulatory challenges posed by
technological innovation, it’s necessary first to consider how the
Supreme Court’s speech jurisprudence affects potential regulatory
actions. This Section analyzes how the Court’s recent case law is likely
to affect regulatory power over professional speech. It makes three
predictions for the future of professional licensing. First, speech
restrictions are likely to be increasingly vulnerable to legal challenges,
but licensing itself is unlikely to go away any time soon. Second, healthTests that Provide Genetic Risk Information for Certain Conditions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-allows-marketingfirst-direct-consumer-tests-provide-genetic-risk-information-certain-conditions (last
updated Mar. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/84F9-QNN9].
178 Direct-to-Consumer Tests, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
medical-devices/vitro-diagnostics/direct-consumer-tests (last updated Dec. 20, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/UH6U-AFKX].
179 See, e.g., Linnea M. Baudhuin, The FDA and 23andMe: Violating the First
Amendment or Protecting the Rights of Consumers?, 60 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 835, 835-37
(2014) (discussing the argument that FDA regulation of 23andMe, which prohibits it
from providing health-related genetic risk assessments, violates First Amendment free
speech rights and discussing the shortcomings of DTC tests); Adam Candeub, Digital
Medicine, The FDA, and The First Amendment, 49 GA. L. REV. 933, 968-69 (2015) ( “[T]he
Supreme Court [has] ruled that healthcare information is protected speech and
restrictions on the dissemination of such information are subject to strict scrutiny.”).
180 See Candeub, supra note 179, at 939-40, 971-80.
181 Baudhuin, supra note 179, at 835.
182 Direct-to-Consumer Tests, supra note 178.
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care regulations are more likely to be upheld than other professional
speech restrictions. Third, even if false speech carries constitutional
protection, there is still room for private litigation based on individual
harm caused by such speech.
1.

Speech Restrictions Are Vulnerable to Challenge, but Licensing
Is Unlikely to Disappear

It appears unlikely that the Court will back off its speech-protective
jurisprudence any time soon. In addition to the cases directly affecting
professional regulation, the Supreme Court has decided First
Amendment cases that signal its continuing commitment to place freespeech principles over regulatory deference. More than ten years ago in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,183 the Court recognized
corporate free-speech rights and relied on the First Amendment to
strike down campaign finance regulations. In doing so, the Court
demonstrated an “increasing tendency to construe the First
Amendment as a shield that private market actors can wield against
government regulation, rather than (as it once did) as a mechanism for
safeguarding free speech values against the threat posed to them by both
private and government power.”184
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this position recently, when it held in
a 5–4 decision that public-sector “access fees” charged to employees
opting out of union membership violated employees’ free-speech
rights.185 In dissent, Justice Kagan sharply criticized the Court for
“turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it against
workaday economic and regulatory policy.”186 She warned that the
Court’s free-speech jurisprudence — including its decisions in Sorrell
and NIFLA — could have broad effects that threatened to overwhelm
historical regulatory approaches.187 She noted that “[s]peech is
everywhere” and that “almost all economic and regulatory policy affects
or touches speech.”188
Justice Kagan is undoubtedly correct that all or nearly all regulatory
policy affects speech — and this is particularly true for professional
regulation in the fields of law and medicine. Nonetheless, the Court
183

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Lakier, supra note 8, at 1324.
185 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2478 (2018).
186 Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
187 See id. at 2501-02.
188 Id. at 2502.
184
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shows no sign of backing off favoring speech over regulation, especially
with the recent turnover in membership.189
Furthermore, the areas where most challenges are currently being
raised in law and medicine would seem to be especially vulnerable
under the Roberts Court’s free-speech jurisprudence. The legal
profession’s ban on outside investment, for example, has a substantial
protectionist basis and only a hypothetical public-protection rationale.
Under NIFLA, a mere hypothetical basis for public protection is likely
insufficient to support the regulation. If states cannot put forward
evidence demonstrating that the ban is narrowly tailored to protect
against a provable harm, the regulation is likely to be deemed
unconstitutional. Requiring extensive disclaimers regarding attorneys’
marketing speech and banning non-lawyer advice on matters touching
legal rights are both similarly likely to fail under the NIFLA standard —
and, to the extent that such regulations are adopted by boards
comprised predominantly of practicing attorneys, may also give rise to
antitrust challenges. Speech restrictions are similarly vulnerable on the
medical side, as courts going forward are unlikely simply to defer to the
fact of state regulation. Instead, under the Supreme Court’s more
restrictive approach, courts will have to provide a more searching
analysis of both the bases for such regulations and the processes by
which they were adopted.
This more searching review will limit the government’s regulatory
power over the professions, but it will not eliminate it. Wholesale
abandonment of licensing is extremely unlikely. Even under the high
bar set by recent Supreme Court cases, the public-protection aspects of
licensing will likely outweigh the restrictions on liberty they impose.190
The speech-restrictive actions taken by licensing entities, however, will
have to meet a higher standard to be upheld.

189 See Lisa Soronen, SCOTUS and the Seismic Shift: What Might It Mean for States and
Local Governments?, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.nlc.org/
article/2020/10/23/scotus-and-the-seismic-shift-what-might-it-mean-for-states-and-localgovernments [https://perma.cc/S3MZ-JJKV] (“The Supreme Court usually hears
numerous First Amendment free speech cases each term. It is not unusual for states and
local governments to lose these cases unanimously or close to it.”).
190 See Claudia E. Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, 72 VAND. L. REV. 501, 559 (2019)
(“The First Amendment, it turns out, is a poor vehicle to challenge professional
licensing regimes.”).
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Health-Care Speech Restrictions Backed by Sound Evidence Are
More Likely to Survive

It’s possible that regulatory actions in the health-care arena will more
easily satisfy the Supreme Court’s higher bar than actions regulating
legal practice. Professional speech in the two fields is similar in many
ways. Both doctors and lawyers are highly trained. And regulation is
needed to protect vulnerable clients and patients who generally lack
“the specialized knowledge necessary to effectively evaluate”
professional advice.191
But the consequences of harm tend to be greater in medicine than in
law.192 Bad advice on medical matters is far more likely to lead to
physical injury or even death, and these consequences cannot be
undone by financial compensation.193 This may explain, in part, lower
courts’ efforts to uphold speech-restrictive regulations related to health
care.194 We are already seeing courts grapple with whether these
restrictions are consistent with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.195
The easiest way to reconcile these tensions may be to hold that even if
a higher standard of scrutiny applies, health-care regulations will
survive a high level of scrutiny as long as they are backed by an
evidentiary record showing a positive effect on patient safety.196
At the same time, requiring an evidentiary record to uphold speech
restrictions would likely mean striking down some current speech
regulations. As discussed above, health care has sometimes been the
191 Cassandra Burke Robertson, How Should We License Lawyers?, 89 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1295, 1307 (2021).
192 See Miller & Berkman, supra note 41, at 654 (recommending tying physician
speech protection to patient safety, and arguing that “[p]hysician speech is professional
speech—not medical conduct—when treating it as such promotes patient safety, occurs
within the confines of a doctor-patient relationship, and is supported by evidence-based
medicine”).
193 See Bambauer, supra note 3, at 83 (“If claims that are very likely to be false are
also likely to cause harm, the state can intervene on behalf of public safety without
imposing a singular and authoritative definition of truth.”).
194 See supra Part II.B.
195 See, e.g., Hines v. Quillivan, 982 F.3d 266, 272 (5th Cir. 2020) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s abrogation of a lower court’s ruling); Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981
F.3d 854, 861, 864, 866-68, 872 (11th Cir. 2020) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
consistent rejection of attempts to set aside the dangers of content-based speech
regulation, and noting that the Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted a per se rule
regarding viewpoint-based speech restrictions).
196 See Miller & Berkman, supra note 41, at 654 (“[T]here remain definitional
questions about how promotion of patient safety ought to be quantified, how a doctorpatient relationship ought to be recognized, and how much evidence (and of what type)
demonstrates evidence-based medicine.”).
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target of both compelled and forbidden speech mandates that are highly
politicized.197 Courts upholding such regulations have broadly deferred
to legislative actions.198 If heightened scrutiny is applied, regulations
that amount to “an attempt to skew the marketplace of ideas or invade
the buffer of confidentiality and autonomy that protects the integrity of
the professional-client relationship” are likely to fail.199 Regulations
backed by an evidentiary record, however, are more likely to survive.200
In this way, heightened scrutiny actually increases courts’ ability to
engage in quality control and weed out requirements that are merely
political.201
3.

Private Litigation May Play a Role in Protecting Against False
and Harmful Professional Speech

What happens if legal or medical professionals engage in false speech?
To the extent that speech protection puts governmental regulation at
risk, it is possible that private law — and especially litigation — may
play a larger role in enforcing standards of professional care.202 Having
a right to engage in speech, after all, does not insulate professionals from
malpractice liability for harms caused when that speech amounts to
fraud, negligence, or ineptitude. It is true that taken to its logical
extreme, free-speech principles could protect even negligent or
197 See supra Part II.B; see also Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94
IND. L.J. 1351, 1406 (2019) (“[I]n some cases, the State might use (and has used)
compelled speech to force speakers to affirm an ideological viewpoint.”).
198 See, e.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is well
recognized that a state enjoys considerable latitude to regulate the conduct of its
licensed health care professionals in administering treatment.”).
199 Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L.
REV. 67, 112 (2016).
200 See Jane R. Bambauer, The Empirical First Amendment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 960
(2017) (“[E]mpirical studies and data can help improve the state’s selection of political
priorities and the efficacy of its political solutions.”).
201 Of course, some regulations may have both an evidentiary basis and a political
bent. Politicization by itself is not a reason to strike down regulations affecting speech.
See Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 910 (2015)
(“Nor should mandated factual disclosures become constitutionally disfavored because
they occur in circumstances of acrimonious political controversy. The need for sober
factual disclosures might be most urgent in the context of socially contested issues like
tobacco or obesity.”).
202 See Armijo, supra note 10, at 1430-31 (suggesting that “foregrounding of the
relevant private common law” would protect against the risk of limiting regulation in
areas such as “food labeling requirements, most securities disclosures, professional
responsibility rules for lawyers, rules concerning doctor-patient confidentiality, and a
host of other safety-based regulations”).
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fraudulent speech if professional speech no longer has a categorical
exclusion from First Amendment protection.203 But even the
elimination of a categorical exclusion does not result in absolute
protection for all speech — it merely requires a higher level of
scrutiny.204
The Supreme Court protects even blatantly untruthful speech on First
Amendment grounds in some circumstances. In U.S. v. Alvarez, the
Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act.205 The government had argued
that criminal prosecution for lying about military honors was allowable
because the First Amendment did not protect false speech.206 The
government pointed to defamation liability and fraud liability as
demonstrating that false speech could render an individual civilly and
criminally liable. The Supreme Court held that false speech was not
categorically excluded from the First Amendment, but rather that legal
limits on false speech may be more likely to survive heightened
scrutiny.207 The Court explained that there must be a “direct causal link
between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”208
When the speech is diffuse and public-directed, as with lying generally
about military honors, the Court concluded that counterspeech should
generally “suffice to achieve [the government’s] interest.”209
The Court may be wrong about whether government counterspeech
will suffice to protect the public interest in the face of false
statements.210 Nonetheless, the Alvarez opinion makes it clear that even

203 Amanda Shanor, Business Licensing and Constitutional Liberty, 126 YALE L.J. F.
314, 320-21 (2016) (“If the ‘speaking’ nature of a profession were sufficient to trigger
stringent review of the regulation of that profession, professional conduct such as
malpractice and fraud would be entitled to stringent review as well.”).
204 Thus, for example, a First Amendment challenge to a Florida restriction on
personal fundraising by judges failed; the Court applied heightened scrutiny, but
nevertheless concluded the restriction was “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest,” and therefore “the First Amendment poses no obstacle to its
enforcement . . . Florida may continue to prohibit judicial candidates from personally
soliciting campaign funds, while allowing them to raise money through committees and
to otherwise communicate their electoral messages in practically any way.” WilliamsYulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 455 (2015).
205 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012).
206 Id. at 715.
207 Id. at 720-22.
208 Id. at 725.
209 Id. at 726.
210 See Zack Stanton, You’re Living in the Golden Age of Conspiracy Theories, POLITICO
(June 12, 2020, 7:55 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/06/17/
conspiracy-theories-pandemic-trump-2020-election-coronavirus-326530 [https://perma.cc/
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false statements will have constitutional protection. It is only when the
risks created by professional speech are high enough that restrictions
will survive strict scrutiny.211
Constitutional protection for false speech, however, does not mean
that professionals cannot be subject to liability for fraud or malpractice.
The harms caused by fraud and malpractice are almost certainly distinct
and concrete enough to allow the claims to survive heightened
scrutiny.212 Applying strict scrutiny to professional speech does not
insulate such speech from liability. Instead, constitutional analysis is
aimed only at “filtering out government regulation that is not, in the
classic sense, targeted at preventing criminal, tortious, or palpably
unethical professional conduct.”213 But private lawsuits seeking
compensation for provable harm are likely to pass even a test of strict
scrutiny.
III. PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION AT SCALE
The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence heightening speech
protection has created a regulatory challenge for states. If the shift
toward greater protection for professional speech had happened twenty
or thirty years ago, it probably would have been relatively simple to
reach a new regulatory equilibrium by backing off of some of the more
protectionist restrictions and building a stronger evidentiary record to
support the regulations that play a key role in protecting the public.
Today, however, it is more difficult to reach a new regulatory
equilibrium because technological advances — and in particular,
massive digital platforms — have changed the scale of professional
influence and therefore changed the entire regulatory context.214

5AVA-X2D3] (“What’s a trusted source for somebody who is literally defined by thinking
that everyone and everything is a lie and against them and a conspiracy?”).
211 See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26 (2010) (upholding
restrictions on attorney speech imposed by a “statute [that] is carefully drawn to cover
only a narrow category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination with
foreign groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations”).
212 See John S. Ehrett, Speak No Evil, Do No Harm: A New Legal Standard for
Professional Speech Regulation, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 184, 191 (explaining that
under a harm-based analysis, “a vast swath of occupational licensing laws . . . that would
otherwise restrict speech with no substantial likelihood of doing harm to a client—
would almost certainly fail strict scrutiny review, and be struck down as
unconstitutional,” but that “the legal structures allowing for malpractice liability and
lawsuits arising from false advertising” would pass).
213 Smolla, supra note 199, at 112.
214 Ohm, supra note 1, at 546.
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What does it mean to regulate at scale? Professor Paul Ohm has
described the effect of “massive digital platforms” that affect the
“mathematics of regulation.”215 He explains that law tends to work
linearly, while the “power and harm of online activity” grow at a much
faster rate, thus creating a situation in which regulatory policy fails to
keep up with its underlying goal of public protection.216 He points to
the following: (1) the ability of digital platforms to facilitate crossborder communication even as regulatory authority remains
jurisdictionally-bound; (2) the ability of a single communication to
achieve a much larger scale of influence, potentially “touch[ing] the
lives of billions;” and (3) the growth of artificial intelligence (“AI”)
programs that may come with unexpected externalities.217
These problems of regulatory scale affect regulatory policy in both
law and health care. Traditionally, professional speech occurred on an
individual basis: a doctor talking to a patient or a lawyer talking to a
client. Professional regulation accordingly relied primarily on licensing,
discipline, and exclusion from the profession to maintain quality and
safety standards. Thus, regulatory bodies licensed individuals qualified
to render advice, disciplined those whose advice breached the
professional standard of care, and excluded non-professionals from
engaging in conduct within the regulatory sphere. Of course, even
under the traditional approach, there have always been some questions
at the margin that didn’t fit well in the traditional regulatory scheme:
Does a bank that helps a client set up a trust engage in the unauthorized
practice of law? Does an herbalist who recommends dietary
supplements to individuals engage in unlicensed medical practice?218
But even though these kinds of edge-cases received media attention and
were the subject of academic discussion,219 they were rare enough that

215

Id.
Id.
217 Id. at 548-52.
218 At least one state has upheld a criminal conviction for practicing medicine
without a license under this scenario. State v. Miller, 542 N.W.2d 241, 246-47 (Iowa
1995).
219 See, e.g., Emilie Beau Lucchesi, Cure or Con? Self-Described Healers and Health
Coaches Avoid Regulatory Scrutiny by Promoting Products on Social Media, 160 ABA J. 42
(2020) (discussing several such cases, including a woman who faced sanctions for
offering health and nutrition coaching without being licensed as a dietician); Michael
S. Knowles, Note, Keep Your Friends Close and the Laymen Closer: State Bar Associations
Can Combat the Problems Associated with Nonlawyers Engaging in the Unauthorized
Practice of Estate Planning Through A Certification System, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 855,
886 (2010) (noting that the ambiguity of what it means to “practice law” creates
confusion for nonlawyer estate planners).
216
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they did not upend the traditional structure of professional regulation
that focused on individual qualifications and one-to-one
communications.
The scale of modern mass communication offers a much larger threat
to the viability of traditional regulatory approaches. Online forums such
as Reddit’s “legal advice” board allow individuals to pose questions
about their legal rights and remedies and to receive near-instantaneous
responses from around the globe, both from lawyers and laypeople.220
In the medical sphere, Icliniq.com provides an “Ask a Doctor Online”
service through which users enter their health queries, create an
account, and receive medical advice from a doctor.221 Sibly is an
employee wellness app that connects individuals to empathetic
coaches,222 individuals who deliver “confidential, science-based
coaching, backed by a high fidelity system, whenever [] employees need
someone to talk to.”223
As a result of the challenge posed by massive digital platforms, merely
rebalancing the regulatory equilibrium will not go far enough to meet
the needs of public protection today. Instead, effective professional
regulation requires rethinking both the goals and methods of
professional regulation — and requires doing so within the speechprotective framework adopted by the Supreme Court. This Part
examines the regulatory challenges posed by modern technology. It
begins with an analysis of health care and medical practice, as this area
is more comprehensively regulated than legal practice. It examines the
regulatory challenges posed by telemedicine, AI, and the diffusion of
false and unreliable health information through social media. It then
220 E.g., r/legaladvice, REDDIT.COM, https://www.reddit.com/r/legaladvice (last visited
Oct. 26, 2021) [https://perma.cc/J7BL-CRFJ].
221 Ask a Doctor Online, ICLINIQ, https://www.icliniq.com/ask-a-doctor-online (last
visited Nov. 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/W9QS-CAUN]. iCliniq.com states that its
“doctor panel consists of medical practitioners, physicians and therapists from US, UK,
UAE, India, Singapore, Germany and counting.” About iCliniq, ICLINIQ,
https://www.icliniq.com/p/aboutus (last visited Nov. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/J39QDDX8].
222 Sibly. Someone To Talk To™, SIBLY, https://www.sibly.com (last visited Jan. 25,
2022) [https://perma.cc/M2QB-75JF].
223 Sibly Brings Empathy to Your Workplace, SIBLY, https://www.sibly.com (last visited
Jan. 25, 2022) [https://perma.cc/ST9S-2VV2]. Sibly’s terms of use explicitly state that
“Sibly only provides an online platform to connect users with coaches for one-on-one
digital interfacing. Sibly Coaches are not authorized to provide services requiring
professional licensure (e.g., psychotherapy or psychiatry).” In addition, Sibly asserts
that it cannot guarantee the “competence of any Sibly coach.” Terms of Use, SIBLY,
https://www.sibly.com/terms-of-use (last updated Aug. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/
V36C-MTRV].
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turns to the field of legal practice, assessing how technology has a
similar effect on legal practice as it collapses geographic boundaries,
enables mass communication, and creates both opportunities and risks
with the integration of AI.
A. Health Care and Technology
Technology has changed the practice of medicine in profound ways.
It has enabled health care providers to reach far beyond their local
offices and to broaden their capabilities. However, technology also
comes with risks and shortcomings that require careful regulatory
responses. This Section will address three areas of technology-enabled
medical practice: telemedicine, artificial intelligence, and
communication through social media.
1.

Telemedicine

Telemedicine enables clinicians to assess, diagnose and treat patients
without in-person visits using telecommunications technology such as
smartphones, tablets, and computers.224 Telemedicine is a subset of
telehealth, which also includes remote patient monitoring, remote
communication among clinicians, and other activities.225
There are two types of telemedicine. The first is synchronous, or realtime video encounters between patients and clinicians.226 Some realtime visits take place in medical offices so that a nurse or other assistant
can engage in hands-on assessment, such as taking blood pressure or
placing a stethoscope on the patient.227 The second form of telemedicine
is asynchronous, or “store-and-forward” communication.228 Here,
health care providers gather information about the patient, including
the patient’s narrative, lab results, images, videos, and medical records,
and send it securely online for analysis by another party, such as a
specialist.229 The patient then receives a diagnosis and treatment plan.230
224 What Is Telemedicine?, MEDSCAPE, https://www.medscape.com/courses/section/
921359 (last visited Dec. 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/VD4N-BDMJ].
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.; Eric Wicklund, Store-and-Forward Telemedicine Services Expand Connected
Health, MHEALTH INTEL. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://mhealthintelligence.com/features/storeand-forward-telemedicine-services-expand-connected-health [https://perma.cc/BS49FLDG].
229 MEDSCAPE, supra note 224; Wicklund, supra note 228.
230 Wicklund, supra note 228; see also MEDSCAPE, supra note 224.
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Store-and-forward is often used for dermatology, pathology, and
radiology services.231
Experts estimate that in 2019, thirty percent of doctors and over fifty
percent of hospitals had access to telemedicine.232 In 2020, during the
COVID-19 pandemic, telemedicine use grew dramatically.233 This
option enabled patients to consult health care providers while
remaining socially isolated in the safety of their own homes.234
a.

Telemedicine Benefits and Limitations

Telemedicine has many potential benefits.235 Telemedicine care can
be as effective as in-person care in many cases.236 A Massachusetts
231

MEDSCAPE, supra note 224.
Id.
233 COVID-19 and the Rise of Telemedicine, MED. FUTURIST (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://medicalfuturist.com/covid-19-was-needed-for-telemedicine-to-finally-gomainstream/ [https://perma.cc/6MV5-9U92]; Research Shows Patients and Clinicians
Rated Telemedicine Care Positively During COVID-19 Pandemic, PENN MED. NEWS (June
24, 2020), https://www.pennmedicine.org/news/news-releases/2020/june/patients-andclinicians-rated-telemedicine-care-positively-during-covid
[https://perma.cc/M6QE3ZU6] (reporting on a survey that found that at Penn Medicine, “[i]n one week . . .
[the] gastroenterology and hepatology practice went from doing roughly 5 percent of
. . . visits per week with telemedicine to 94 percent”).
234 Alicia Adamczyk, Can’t See Your Doctor in Person? Take Advantage of Your
Telemedicine Options, CNBC MAKE IT (May 6, 2020, 2:39 PM EDT),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/why-you-should-take-advantage-of-your-telemedicineoptions.html [https://perma.cc/VY5J-CCG6].
235 Zawn Villines, Telemedicine Benefits: For Patients and Professionals, MED. NEWS
TODAY (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.medicalnewsto day.com/articles/telemedicinebenefits [https://perma.cc/4SDH-QPEQ].
236 See id.; Joel E. Barthelemy, Virtual Care vs. In-Person Visits: Which is Higher
Quality?, GLOBALMED (July 15, 2019), https://www.globalmed.com/telemedicine-vs-inperson-visits-which-is-higher-quality/ [https://perma.cc/Y7DQ-KTLX]; see also Astrid
Buvik, Einar Bugge, Gunnar Knutsen, Arvid Småbrekke & Tom Wilsgaard, Patient
Reported Outcomes with Remote Orthopaedic Consultations by Telemedicine: A Randomised
Controlled Trial, 25 J. TELEMEDICINE & TELECARE 451, 451 (2019) (“We did not observe
any difference in patient-reported satisfaction and health . . . between video-assisted and
standard consultations.”); Khidir Dalouk, Nainesh Gandhi, Peter Jessel, Karen
MacMurdy, Ignatius Gerardo Zarraga, Michael Lasarev & Merritt Raitt, Outcomes of
Telemedicine Video-Conferencing Clinic Versus In-Person Clinic Follow-Up for Implantable
Cardioverter-Defibrillator Recipients, 10 CIRCULATION: ARRYTHMIA & ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY
1, 8 (2017), https://www.ahajournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1161/CIRCEP.117.005217
[https://perma.cc/9MMT-TF6Y] (finding that outcomes for patients who received
follow-up care by videoconferencing were “noninferior” to outcomes for those receiving
in-person follow-up); Jessica F. Robb, Megan H. Hyland & Andrew D. Goodman,
Comparison of Telemedicine Versus In-Person Visits for Persons with Multiple Sclerosis: A
Randomized Crossover Study of Feasibility, Cost, and Satisfaction, 36 MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS
& RELATED DISORDERS 1, 3 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.msard.2019.05.001
232
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General Hospital study found that among established patients, “[m]ost
patients (62.6%) and clinicians (59.0%) reported ‘no difference’
between virtual and office visits on ‘the overall quality of the visit.’”237
A different study focused on telemedicine in intensive care units that
enables off-site critical care experts to support patient care.238 The study
found that telemedicine “may reduce ICU mortality, hospital mortality,
and lengths of ICU stays” though not the overall length of hospital
stays.239
In addition, telemedicine appointments can be very convenient for
patients, sparing them the need to travel to medical facilities and take
extended time off from work or find childcare coverage.240
Consequently, patients may receive more continuous medical oversight
and avoid care disruptions.241 Telemedicine can also be less expensive
than in-person visits.242 According to one study, telemedicine visits on
average cost $79, while in-person office visits cost $146.243 These
benefits can be of particular value to members of vulnerable populations
that face access barriers, such as the elderly, people with disabilities, or
economically disadvantaged individuals.244
Telemedicine can be beneficial for providers as well. If they do a
significant portion of their work through telemedicine, they may be able
to cut costs by renting smaller office spaces and paying for less

[https://perma.cc/X94F-KD44] (reporting that 97.1 percent of patients would
recommend televisits to others, and 94.3 percent of patients found it easy to connect
with their provider via telemedicine).
237 Karen Donelan, Esteban A. Barreto, Sarah Sossong, Carie Michael, Juan J. Estrada,
Adam B. Cohen, Janet Wozniak & Lee H. Schwamm, Patient and Clinician Experiences
with Telehealth for Patient Follow-up Care, 25 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 40, 42 (2019).
238 Jing Chen, Dalong Sun, Weiming Yang, Mingli Liu, Shufan Zhang, Jinhua Peng
& Chuancheng Ren, Clinical and Economic Outcomes of Telemedicine Programs in the
Intensive Care Unit: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 33 J. INTENSIVE CARE MED.
383, 384 (2018).
239 Id. at 391.
240 Donelan et al., supra note 237, at 40.
241 Using Telehealth to Expand Access to Essential Health Services During the COVID19 Pandemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/telehealth.html (last updated June 10, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/NZ9Q-9PBN].
242 Adamczyk, supra note 234.
243 J. Scott Ashwood, Ateev Mehrotra, David Cowling & Lori Uscher-Pines, DirectTo-Consumer Telehealth May Increase Access to Care but Does Not Decrease Spending, 36
HEALTH AFFS. 485, 488 (2017) (concluding that nevertheless, because of its
convenience, telehealth increases utilization of medical services and therefore raises
overall health-care spending).
244 Villines, supra note 235.
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administrative assistance.245 In addition, they may be able to serve more
patients and supplement their incomes, and during COVID-19,
telemedicine enabled clinicians to reduce their risk of infection by
avoiding in-person contact with patients.246
At the same time, telemedicine has several risks and limitations. In
some cases, it is more appropriate to examine a patient face-to-face, and
pursuing a virtual consultation could delay urgently needed care or
even lead to a misdiagnosis.247 In addition, both the clinician and the
patient must be sufficiently adept with technology to avoid glitches,
and, depending on the medical problem, the patient may need to have
a space at home in which to conduct the visit privately.248 Other privacy
concerns may arise if the technology does not meet state-of-the art
security standards and is thus vulnerable to hacking.249 Finally,
clinicians and patients wishing to use telemedicine often face a variety
of regulatory barriers.
b.

Telemedicine Regulation

Extensive regulations govern telemedicine.250 While technology
theoretically should enable clinicians to render services throughout the
United States, they are often severely constrained by federal and state
laws. Nevertheless, telemedicine regulations demonstrate the ability of
the state and federal governments to accommodate changing demands
and circumstances in the health care arena.

245

Id.
Id.
247 See Using Telehealth to Expand Access to Essential Health Services During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, supra note 241.
248 See id.
249 Villines, supra note 235.
250 See generally Christian D. Becker, Katherine Dandy, Max Gaujean, Mario Fusaro
& Corey Scurlock, Legal Perspectives on Telemedicine Part 1: Legal and Regulatory Issues,
23 PERMANENTE J. (2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6636526/
pdf/18-293.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7VM-FQ7G] (discussing the extent of state and
federal regulation regarding telehealth, and parity language for patient reimbursement);
CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, STATE TELEHEALTH LAWS & REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES
12-13 (2019), https://www.cchpca.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/50%20State%20Tele
halth%20Laws%20and%20Reibmursement%20Policies%20Report%20Fall%202019%2
0FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6XY-7CGB] (showing Medicaid reimbursement, private
payer laws, and professional requirements by state); FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS.,
TELEMEDICINE POLICIES BOARD BY BOARD OVERVIEW, https://www.fsmb.org/
siteassets/advocacy/key-issues/telemedicine_policies_by_state.pdf (last updated June
2021) [https://perma.cc/38VJ-CXA4] (listing state-by-state medical board regulations
and requirements in addition to Medicaid and private payer reimbursement policies).
246
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One heavily regulated area is licensure. Ordinarily, physicians must be
licensed in each state in which they practice medicine, and this principle
is no different for telemedicine.251 This means that physicians must be
licensed in the state in which their patients are located.252 However,
licensing policies have become somewhat more lenient in many states.
Nine states issue special licenses or certificates that allow out-of-state
clinicians to provide telemedicine services in the state, and several others
permit the practice of medicine across state lines under certain
circumstances (without specifically mentioning telemedicine).253
Thirty-three states, the District of Columbia, and Guam are members
of the Federation of State Medical Boards’ Interstate Medical Licensure
Compact (“IMLC”).254 The compact creates an expedited process by
which licensed physicians can obtain licenses in other states.255 Note
that the IMLC relaxes telemedicine barriers but does not remove them
entirely because physicians still need to obtain licensure in new states,
and not all states are IMLC members.
Three additional compacts facilitate licensure in multiple states.256
The Nurses Licensure Compact (with thirty-four member states) allows
nurses to serve in other states without obtaining additional licenses.257
The Physical Therapy Compact (with twenty member states) allows
eligible physical therapists and physical therapy assistants to purchase
compact privilege in member states and work without obtaining new
licenses.258 The Psychology Interjurisdictional Compact (with fifteen
251 FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 250; Kocher, supra note 124; see, e.g., OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.41(A) (2019) (“No person shall practice medicine and surgery,
or any of its branches, without the appropriate license or certificate from the state
medical board to engage in the practice.”).
252 Becker et al., supra note 250.
253 CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, supra note 250, at 9; FED’N OF STATE MED.
BDS., supra note 250; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 540-X-16-.02 (1997) (allowing for the
“practice of medicine across state lines in a medical emergency” or “on an irregular or
infrequent basis” as defined by the statute); NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.261 (2015)
(authorizing the medical board to issue a “special purpose license to a physician who is
licensed in another state” to provide medical services through telehealth).
254 CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, supra note 250, at 9; A Faster Pathway to
Physician Licensure, INTERSTATE MED. LICENSURE COMPACT, https://www.imlcc.org/afaster-pathway-to-physician-licensure/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2022) [https://perma.cc/
W7ZN-HUY4].
255 A Faster Pathway to Physician Licensure, supra note 254.
256 CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, supra note 250, at 9.
257 Nurse Licensure Compact (NLC), NCSBN, https://www.ncsbn.org/nurselicensure-compact.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5G9G-7TAQ].
258 About the Compact, PT COMPACT, http://ptcompact.org/about-compact (last
visited Dec. 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/8VTH-QQ97]; Compact Map, PT COMPACT,
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member states) allows psychologists licensed in member states to
provide telepsychology services or temporary in-person services in
member states.259
Patients’ ability to obtain insurance coverage for telemedicine is
another area that is subject to regulation. Without insurance payments,
patients and clinicians are unlikely to use telemedicine. Forty states and
the District of Columbia have laws that address private insurers’
reimbursement for telemedicine services.260 However, only a few
require that private insurers pay equally for in-person and telemedicine
services.261
The United States’ primary public insurance programs, Medicaid and
Medicare, have also considered payment for telemedicine.262 Under the
Medicaid program, all states and the District of Columbia pay for some
forms of live video telemedicine.263 However, only fourteen states
reimburse for store-and-forward.264 Medicare provides reimbursement

http://ptcompact.org/ptc-states (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/DHJ8BTDK].
259 About Us, PSYPACT, https://psypact.site-ym.com/page/About (last visited Dec. 29,
2020) [https://perma.cc/DHB8-S68C]. As of 2020, twelve additional states had pending
bills that, if passed, would add them to the compact. Map, PSYPACT,
https://psypact.org/page/psypactmap (last visited Dec. 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
TBE9-W7G9].
260 CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, supra note 250, at 9-10, 15.
261 See id. at 9-10; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3370, 3571R (2021) (“An
insurer . . . shall reimburse the treating provider or the consulting provider for the
diagnosis, consultation, or treatment of the insured delivered through telemedicine
services on the same basis and at least at the rate that the insurer . . . is responsible for
coverage for the provision of the same service through in-person consultation or
contact.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.3(c) (2021) (“Reimbursement for services
provided through telehealth shall be equivalent to reimbursement for the same services
provided via face-to-face contact between a health care provider and a patient.”).
262 Medicaid is a government program that provides health care coverage to lowincome Americans. Medicaid is funded jointly by the states and federal government
while the states administer it in accordance with federal guidelines. Medicaid,
MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/index.html (last visited Dec. 29,
2020) [https://perma.cc/ZNV2-NKL5]. Medicare is a federal program that provides
health care coverage to people who are sixty-five and older, some people with
disabilities, and people with end-stage kidney disease. What’s Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/your-medicare-coverage-choices/whatsmedicare (last visited Dec. 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/C6XJ-ESKS].
263 CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, supra note 250, at 2; FED’N OF STATE MED.
BDS., supra note 250.
264 CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, supra note 250, at 2; FED’N OF STATE MED.
BDS., supra note 250.
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for synchronous telemedicine, but it generally does not pay for storeand-forward services.265
Regulations regarding online prescribing also vary, with some states
embracing a more permissive approach than others.266 Most states
prohibit clinicians from writing prescriptions based exclusively on
patients’ answers to online questionnaires.267 Some states do not address
online prescribing, but many allow clinicians to conduct exams by
telemedicine for prescribing purposes.268
Some states do not authorize doctors who see patients only remotely
to prescribe controlled substances, but an increasing number allow such
prescriptions.269 The latter states have liberalized their laws in response
to the opioid crisis so that telemedicine clinicians can provide
medications such as methadone to treat opioid addiction.270

265 Becker et al., supra note 250; see Telehealth, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.
gov/coverage/telehealth (last visited Dec. 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/A2S4-KN75]; Storeand-Forward, CCHP, https://www.cchpca.org/topic/store-and-forward/#:~:text=Store%2D
and%2DForward%20is%20the,by%20Medicare%20and%20Medicaid%20programs (last
visited Jan. 25, 2022) [https://perma.cc/MR8T-BES5] (stating that reimbursement for
store-and-forward services is available only for demonstration projects in Alaska and
Hawaii).
266 See CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, supra note 250, at 9.
267 Id.; see, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 12, § 40.967(27) (2021) (“[Unprofessional
conduct includes] providing treatment, rendering a diagnosis, or prescribing
medications based solely on a patient-supplied history that a physician licensed in this
state received by telephone, facsimile, or electronic format.”).
268 CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, supra note 250, at 9; see, e.g., ALA. ADMIN.
CODE r. 540-X-9-.11 (2021) (“Prescribing medications for a patient whom the physician
has not personally examined may be suitable under certain circumstances [including]
electronic encounters such as those in telemedicine.”).
269 See CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, supra note 250, at 9. Compare N.J. REV.
STAT. § 45:1-62(e) (2020) (“The prescription of Schedule II controlled dangerous
substances through the use of telemedicine or telehealth shall be authorized only after
an initial in-person examination of the patient . . . .”), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1933(b)(7)(g) (2017) (“Prescriptions made through telemedicine . . . may include
controlled substances, subject to limitations as set by the Board.”).
270 CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y, supra note 250, at 9 (“Many of these laws
have passed as a result of the opioid epidemic and the need to prescribe certain
medications associated with medication assisted therapy (MAT).”); see also Y. Tony
Yang, Eric Weintraub & Rebecca L. Haffajee, Telemedicine’s Role in Addressing the Opioid
Epidemic, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1177, 1177-79 (2018). In some states Medicaid also
now pays for controlled substance prescriptions by telemedicine physicians, as is the
case in Indiana, Minnesota, Michigan, and Louisiana. CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH
POL’Y, supra note 250, at 9.
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Artificial Intelligence

“AI” refers to a computer’s ability to imitate human behavior and
learn.271 Computers learn with the help of algorithms. An algorithm is
a “computational procedure that takes some value, or set of values, as
input and produces some value, or set of values, as output.”272 It is thus
“a sequence of computational steps that transform the input into the
output.”273 Health care providers may rely on AI to assist them in
making decisions or to be a substitute decision maker.274 Clinicians may
input data about a patient’s symptoms, medical history, and personal
details and obtain a suggested diagnosis and treatment plan as the AI
output.275
A well-known type of AI is machine learning, which enables
computers to “automatically detect patterns in data, and then use the
uncovered patterns to predict future data or to perform decisionmaking tasks under uncertainty.”276 Scientists prepare machine learning
algorithms to engage in analysis by using training data.277 For example,
271 See IAN GOODFELLOW, YOSHUA BENGIO & AARON COURVILLE, DEEP LEARNING 1-2
(2016).
272 THOMAS H. CORMEN, CHARLES E. LEISERSON, RONALD L. RIVEST & CLIFFORD STEIN,
INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5 (3d ed. 2009) (emphasis omitted).
273 Id.
274 See infra Part III.A.2.a (discussing the benefits of AI).
275 See AI System Helps Individualize Treatment People Diagnosed with Depression,
MAYO CLINIC (Feb. 17, 2020), https://advancingthescience.mayo.edu/2020/02/17/
mcmag-ai-system-helps-individualize-treatment-people-diagnosed-with-depression/
[https://perma.cc/8K3T-35MB] (“AI methodologies can discover patterns in a patient’s
data . . . that can explain unique characteristics of the specific patient, allowing for the
right treatment to be chosen at the right time and right dose to achieve the therapeutic
benefit.”).
276 KEVIN P. MURPHY, MACHINE LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE 1 (2012); see
also David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn
About Machine Learning, 51 UC DAVIS L. REV. 653, 671 (2017) (“Fundamentally,
machine learning refers to an automated process of discovering correlations (sometimes
alternatively referred to as relationships or patterns) between variables in a dataset,
often to make predictions or estimates of some outcome.”); Alvin Rajkomar, Jeffrey
Dean & Isaac Kohane, Machine Learning in Medicine, 380 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1347, 1348
(2019) (“[I]n machine learning, a model learns from examples rather than being
programmed with rules.”).
277 See SHAI SHALEV-SHWARTZ & SHAI BEN-DAVID, UNDERSTANDING MACHINE
LEARNING: FROM THEORY TO ALGORITHMS 13-14 (2014) (discussing “the statistical
learning framework”); Niha Beig, Mohammadhadi Khorrami, Mehdi Alilou, Prateek
Prasanna, Nathaniel Braman, Mahdi Orooji, Sagar Rakshit, Kaustav Bera, Prabhakar
Rajiah, Jennifer Ginsberg, Christopher Donatelli, Rajat Thawani, Michael Yang, Frank
Jacono, Pallavi Tiwari, Vamsidhar Velcheti, Robert Gilkeson, Philip Linden & Anant
Madabhushi, Perinodular and Intranodular Radiomic Features on Lung CT Images
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developers might show a learning algorithm numerous tumor images
with indications as to whether they are cancerous.278 The algorithm
should then learn to distinguish between benign and malignant growths
when it sees new images.279
Some machine learning algorithms are trained only once and are
considered “locked,” providing the same results each time they are
given the same inputs.280 Others continuously learn and adapt so the
outputs they generate for specific inputs may change over time. 281
Many algorithms are commonly used by physicians and thus
influence the treatment of numerous patients.282 They are thus
becoming an important component of professional medical speech.
a.

AI Benefits and Limitations

AI can allow clinicians to analyze very large data sets quickly and
efficiently so that they can potentially deliver better health care at lower
cost.283 AI can do some of the analytical work that paid staff would
otherwise do and can accomplish it more quickly and efficiently.284 AI

Distinguish Adenocarcinomas from Granulomas, 290 RADIOLOGY 783, 784 (2019) (“A
machine classifier was trained on a cohort of 145 patients . . . .”).
278 Beig et al., supra note 277, at 784.
279 Id. at 792.
280 Greg Slabodkin, Medtronic, GE, Philips Embrace AI amid Regulatory Limbo Around
Algorithms, MEDTECH DIVE (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.medtechdive.com/news/
medtronic-ge-philips-embrace-ai-amid-regulatory-uncertainty-around-algori/592443/
[https://perma.cc/N6C6-9TCP].
281 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
MODIFICATIONS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING (AI/ML)-BASED
SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD) 3 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/files/medical%
20devices/published/US-FDA-Artificial-Intelligence-and-Machine-Learning-DiscussionPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW73-AHGG].
282 Sharon Begley, Racial Bias Skews Algorithms Widely Used to Guide Care from Heart
Surgery to Birth, Study Finds, STAT (June 17, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/
06/17/racial-bias-skews-algorithms-widely-used-to-guide-patient-care/ [https://perma.
cc/LQ9V-L6JP] (“Many of the algorithms are widely used and have a substantial impact
on patient care.”); Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Algorithmic Bias in Health Care: A Path Forward, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20191031.373615/full/
[https://perma.cc/LQ4V-QUQ4] (addressing “an algorithm widely used for population
health management”).
283 Alicia Phaneuf, Use of AI in Healthcare & Medicine Is Booming – Here’s How the
Medical Field is Benefiting from AI in 2020 and Beyond, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 29, 2021, 12:47
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/artificial-intelligence-healthcare [https://perma.
cc/DP4P-V9ZG].
284 Id. (“30% of healthcare costs are associated with administrative tasks.”).
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can also improve the quality of medical care.285 Learning algorithms can
help doctors determine which patients will respond well to different
therapies so that they can tailor their treatments accordingly.286 AI may
also help identify individuals at high risk of contracting particular
diseases so that doctors can screen them regularly.287
AI was also harnessed to combat COVID-19.288 For example,
researchers worked to develop AI tools to predict which children will
suffer severe COVID-19 symptoms.289 Likewise, algorithms have been
trained to analyze computed tomography (“CT”) scans and identify
COVID-19-related pneumonia.290
Medical AI, however, is not devoid of hazards. First, AI can be flawed
and provide incorrect information or advice to doctors, leading to
improper treatment choices.291 Learning algorithms can be poorly
designed or implemented. Moreover, the training data that are used to
develop algorithms may contain serious data errors or gaps.292
AI critics worry not only about medical mistakes, but also about
algorithmic bias.293 Algorithmic bias can lead to discrimination that
285 Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Artificial Intelligence and Discrimination in
Health Care, 19 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 10-12 (2020) [hereinafter Artificial
Intelligence].
286 See EWOUT W. STEYERBERG, CLINICAL PREDICTION MODELS 11 (M. Gail, A. Tsiatis,
K. Krickeberg, W. Wong & J. Sarnet eds., 2009).
287 See id.
288 NIH Harnesses AI for COVID-19 Diagnosis, Treatment, and Monitoring, NAT’L INST.
OF HEALTH (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nihharnesses-ai-covid-19-diagnosis-treatment-monitoring [https://perma.cc/W3K8-U9N5].
289 Jessica Kent, Researchers Use AI to Predict Severe COVID-19-Related Illness,
HEALTH IT ANALYTICS (Aug. 11, 2020), https://healthitanalytics.com/news/researchersuse-ai-to-predict-severe-covid-19-related-illness [https://perma.cc/FW5J-XNYH].
290 Stephanie A. Harmon, Thomas H. Sanford, Sheng Xu, Evrim B. Turkbey, Holger
Roth, Ziyue Xu, Dong Yang, Andriy Myronenko, Victoria Anderson, Amel Amalou,
Maxime Blain, Michael Kassin, Dilara Long, Nicole Varble, Stephanie M. Walker, Ulas
Bagci, Anna Maria Ierardi, Elvira Stellato, Guido Giovanni Plensich, Giuseppe
Franceschelli, Cristiano Girlando, Giovanni Irmici, Dominic Labella, Dima Hammoud,
Ashkan Malayeri, Elizabeth Jones, Ronald M. Summers, Peter L. Choyke, Daguang Xu,
Mona Flores, Kaku Tamura, Hirofumi Obinata, Hitoshi Mori, Fracesca Patella, Maurizio
Cariati, Gianpaolo Carrafiello, Peng An, Bradford J. Wood & Baris Turkbey, Artificial
Intelligence for the Detection of COVID-19 Pneumonia on Chest CT Using Multinational
Datasets, 11 NATURE COMMC’NS 1, 1 (2020).
291 Sharona Hoffman, What Genetic Testing Teaches About Predictive Health Analytics
Regulation, 98 N.C. L. REV. 123, 151-54 (2019) [hereinafter Genetic Testing]; W.
Nicholson Price II, Risks and Remedies for Artificial Intelligence in Health Care,
BROOKINGS (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/risks-and-remediesfor-artificial-intelligence-in-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/UFR4-6QQF].
292 See Hoffman, Genetic Testing, supra note 291, at 152-53.
293 Price II, supra note 291.
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disadvantages particular groups.294 Bias can be rooted in the absence of
appropriate diversity in training data.295 For example, if the training
data come from a health system that serves primarily white and wealthy
patients, the algorithm may not be generalizable to other patients.296 It
might thus work well for privileged white patients but make mistakes
with respect to others.
To illustrate, an algorithm used to refer patients with chronic disease
to high-risk care management programs favored Whites over sicker
African-Americans.297 It used past medical expenditures as a proxy for
medical needs and interpreted low spending as indicating that an
individual is healthy.298 While this might be true for many people,
health care access barriers such as poverty and lack of insurance often
prevent African-Americans from pursuing adequate medical care.299
The algorithm failed to take this into account and exacerbated the
problem by also excluding African Americans from beneficial disease
management programs.300
In addition, training data may capture existing inequities, causing the
trained algorithm to perpetuate discrimination.301 For example, women
have been found to be less likely than men to receive lipid-lowering
drugs, in-hospital procedures, and proper care at hospital discharge
despite being more likely to have high blood pressure and heart
failure.302 Algorithms developed from training data that reflect such
294

Hoffman & Podgurski, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 285, at 17-19.
Id. at 14-15 (discussing selection bias).
296 Hoffman, Genetic Testing, supra note 291, at 153; Craig Konnoth, Health
Information Equity, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1317, 1361 (2017) (“[R]elying on data that is
biased towards certain social groups can have problematic effects.”).
297 Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli & Sendhil Mullainathan,
Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 366
SCIENCE 447, 447 (2019); Charlotte Jee, A Biased Medical Algorithm Favored White
People for Health-Care Programs, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 25, 2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/f/614626/a-biased-medical-algorithm-favored-whitepeople-for-healthcare-programs/ [https://perma.cc/5H38-N97C].
298 Obermeyer et al., supra note 297, at 447; Jenna Wiens, W. Nicholson Price II &
Michael W. Sjoding, Diagnosing Bias in Data-Driven Algorithms for Healthcare, 26
NATURE MED. 25, 25-26 (2020).
299 Obermeyer et al., supra note 297, at 450.
300 Id. at 447, 449.
301 Hoffman & Podgurski, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 285, at 15-16 (discussing
feedback loop bias).
302 Shanshan Li, Gregg C. Fonarow, Kenneth J. Mukamal, Li Liang, Phillip J. Schulte,
Eric E. Smith, Adam DeVore, Adrian F. Hernandez, Eric D. Peterson & Deepak L. Bhatt,
Sex and Race/Ethnicity-Related Disparities in Care and Outcomes After Hospitalization for
Coronary Artery Disease Among Older Adults, 9 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR QUALITY
& OUTCOMES S36, S38 (2016).
295
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under-treatment will likely learn to recommend less intensive care for
women than men and thus perpetuate the undertreatment problem.303
b.

AI Regulation

The Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) approach to regulating
AI is currently uncertain and evolving.304 The agency acknowledges that
its “traditional paradigm of medical device regulation was not designed
for adaptive artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies.”305
The FDA generally does not extend its reach to algorithms that are
developed and used in-house by health-care providers.306 It does intend
to regulate certain types of software, such as software that analyzes
“physiological signals” for purposes of diagnosis or treatment.307 To that
end, the FDA has approved many algorithms used in the fields of
radiology, cardiology, and internal medicine.308 The FDA also intends
to scrutinize AI tools that are opaque and do not enable clinicians to
understand the basis of recommendations, sometimes called black-box
algorithms.309
The agency has thus far focused its regulatory efforts on locked
algorithms.310 In 2019, it published a discussion paper detailing its

303

Hoffman & Podgurski, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 285, at 16.
Id. at 37-38; see also Slabodkin, supra note 280; Bradley Merrill Thompson, New
Developments in FDA Regulation of AI, MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUS. (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.mddionline.com/new-developments-fda-regulation-ai [https://perma.cc/
Y427-UXUC].
305 Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Software as a Medical Device, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/softwaremedical-device-samd/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-software-medicaldevice [https://perma.cc/XS58-A3TN].
306 Price II, supra note 291.
307 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SOFTWARE: DRAFT
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 10-11, 25 (2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/109618/download [https://perma.cc/A5EV-BPGG]; Thompson,
supra note 304.
308 Stan Benjamens, Pranavsingh Dhunnoo & Bertalan Meskó, The State of Artificial
Intelligence-Based FDA-Approved Medical Devices and Algorithms: An Online Database, 3
NPJ DIGIT. MED. 1, 1 (2020); see Data Sci. Inst., FDA Cleared AI Algorithms, AM. COLL.
RADIOLOGY, https://www.acrdsi.org/DSI-Services/FDA-Cleared-AI-Algorithms (last
visited Dec. 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/F72S-9WZ5].
309 See Sara G. Murray, Robert M. Wachter & Russell J. Cucina, Discrimination by
Artificial Intelligence in a Commercial Electronic Health Record—A Case Study, HEALTH
AFFS. BLOG (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog
20200128.626576/full/ [https://perma.cc/MY65-7LTW].
310 See Slabodkin, supra note 280 and accompanying text, for an explanation of
locked algorithms.
304
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“foundation for a potential approach to premarket review for artificial
intelligence and machine learning-driven software modifications.”311
But the FDA has taken no further action to promulgate regulations for
adaptive AI.312
Congress has also shown interest in the issue of AI integrity. In 2019
Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) and
Representative Yvette Clarke (D-NY) introduced a bill called the
“Algorithmic Accountability Act.”313
The bill would do the following:
•

Authorize the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to require
covered entities to conduct impact assessments of any highly
sensitive automated decision systems.

•

Require covered entities to evaluate their automated decision
systems and associated training data in order to identify problems
in the areas of accuracy, fairness, bias, discrimination, privacy and
security.

•

Require covered entities to assess their information systems’
ability to protect data subjects’ privacy and safeguard data
security.

•

Require covered entities to resolve identified problems.314

The proposed Algorithmic Accountability Act was subject to a variety
of criticisms and did not become law.315 However, legislative action may
311 Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Software as a Medical Device, supra
note 305.
312 Slabodkin, supra note 280.
313 S. 1108, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019); Booker, Wyden,
Clarke Introduce Bill Requiring Companies to Target Bias in Corporate Algorithms, CORY
BOOKER (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-wydenclarke-introduce-bill-requiring-companies-to-target-bias-in-corporate-algorithms
[https://perma.cc/A3YR-8WTA] [hereinafter Booker].
314 S. 1108 §§ 2(2), 2(6), 3(b); Booker, supra note 313. A covered entity would have
included any person, partnership, or corporation that is subject to FTC regulations and
earns more than $50 million annually, possesses or controls personal information from
at least one million people or consumer devices, or primarily acts as a data broker that
acquires, processes, and sells consumer data. S. 1108 § 2(5).
315 S. 1108 (116th): Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019,
GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/s1108 (last visited Dec. 29, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/8XP4-S5PS]; Joshua New, How to Fix the Algorithmic Accountability
Act, CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.datainnovation.org/
2019/09/how-to-fix-the-algorithmic-accountability-act/ [https://perma.cc/6LMA-J3KD].
A version of the bill was reintroduced in Congress as the Algorithmic Accountability
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be more successful in the future and is an additional path to establishing
algorithmic oversight and promoting AI fairness.
3.

Propagation of False Information

Technology enables individuals to reach almost limitless audiences
and to convey information nationally and internationally. This includes
information that is incorrect and even harmful.316 For example, in July
of 2020 a video of doctors making false claims about COVID-19 went
viral after it was shared on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.317 In the
video, one doctor asserted that hydroxychloroquine, zinc, and
Zithromax were a cure for the pandemic, rendering masks
unnecessary.318 Another argued that lockdowns did not significantly
decrease COVID-19 death rates.319 In a different video, Dr. Annie
Bukacek claimed that death certificates were wrongly attributing deaths
to COVID-19.320 In yet another viral video, virologist Judy Mikovits
falsely asserted that the number of COVID-19 deaths was inflated, that
the virus was activated by face masks, and that Dr. Anthony Fauci was
responsible for the deaths of millions of HIV/AIDS patients in the
1980s.321

Act of 2022 in February of 2022, shortly before this article went to print. See Kristin L.
Bryan, Kyle R. Fath & Gicel Tomimbang, Federal Lawmakers in House and Senate
Introduce Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2022, 12 NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 11, 2022),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/federal-lawmakers-house-and-senate-introducealgorithmic-accountability-act-2022 [https://perma.cc/DK8R-AQYE].
316 EJ Dickson, On TikTok, COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories Flourish Amid Viral
Dances, ROLLING STONE (May 13, 2020, 9:48 AM ET), https://www.rollingstone.com/
culture/culture-features/tiktok-conspiracy-theories-bill-gates-microchip-vaccine-996394/
[https://perma.cc/TB2W-AHZB].
317 Daniel Funke, Who Are the Doctors in the Viral Hydroxychloroquine Video?,
POLITIFACT (July 29, 2020), https://www.politifact.com/article/2020/jul/29/who-aredoctors-viral-hydroxychloroquine-video/ [https://perma.cc/QR6S-2LGZ].
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 EJ Dickson, Anti-Vax Doctor Promotes Conspiracy Theory that Death Certificates
Falsely Cite COVID-19, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 16, 2020, 2:47 PM ET),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/anti-vax-doctor-covid-19-deathcertificates-984407/ [https://perma.cc/7UW3-5ZB6].
321 Martin Enserink & Jon Cohen, Fact-Checking Judy Mikovits, the Controversial
Virologist Attacking Anthony Fauci in a Viral Conspiracy Video, SCIENCE MAG. (May 8, 2020),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/05/fact-checking-judy-mikovits-controversialvirologist-attacking-anthony-fauci-viral [https://perma.cc/W9SC-DVE9].
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B. Legal Advice and Technology
The rise of digital platforms has had three primary effects in the
practice of law. First, it has made it easier for legal practice to cross state
and even national boundaries. Second, it enables communication about
legal matters to extend far beyond the traditional lawyer-client
relationship. Finally, it has enabled the growth of AI systems that affect
legal practice in ways that change the norms, expectations, and effects
of legal work. This Subpart explores how each of those changes in the
scale of legal practice shapes the scope and results of regulatory policy.
1.

Illusory Geographic Boundaries

The practice of law is regulated at the state level.322 But with modern
technology, state borders have little relevance to daily practice —
lawyers can often do their work from anywhere, meeting virtually with
clients and negotiating deals and settlements through email or video
conferencing. Unlike telemedicine, which is regulated extensively, there
is little direct regulation of virtual lawyering — instead, virtual and
cross-border practice is regulated largely through the application of
regulations on the unauthorized practice of law, which is often not a
perfect fit.323
The gap between regulatory standards and common practice is
growing. From the standpoint of a reasonable lawyer, there is no reason
why a lawyer with expertise in a practice area shouldn’t assist clients in
need of that expertise even when the lawyer and client reside in different
states. Research also shows that regulatory overreach in UPL
enforcement negatively affects access to justice.324

322 Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics, Nationalizing Law Practice, and the Future of
the American Legal Profession in a Global Age, 48 S.D. L. REV. 489, 498 (2011)
(“Although the practice of law grows national, the regulation of the legal profession
continues to be state based in four fundamental interrelated ways [including admission
to practice, licensing, adoption of ethical rules, and disciplinary enforcement].”).
323 See, e.g., Karen Rubin, Out-of-State Lawyer Disciplined for E-Mail Negotiations; No
Safe Harbor from Unauthorized Practice, Says MN Court, THE L. FOR LAWS. TODAY (Oct.
6, 2016), https://www.thelawforlawyerstoday.com/2016/10/2845/ [https://perma.cc/
4SVM-UTF8] (“[T]urf protection by state regulators has thwarted hopes for a multijurisdictional outlook that would be more in line with the realities of modern-day legal
practice.”).
324 Paul R. Tremblay, Surrogate Lawyering: Legal Guidance, Sans Lawyers, 31 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 377, 420 (2018) (explaining that “the ambiguity about the definition and
limits of the practice of law” creates an unfortunate “constraint on innovation in the
field of access-to-justice”).
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But when a lawyer in Colorado tried to help his in-laws in Minnesota
negotiate a debt-collection action, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the Colorado lawyer had engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.325 The attorney hadn’t charged his in-laws a fee, hadn’t claimed to
be licensed in Minnesota, hadn’t appeared in a Minnesota court, and
hadn’t practiced beyond his level of competence. Nonetheless, the court
held that by attempting to negotiate a debt for Minnesota residents
against a Minnesota creditor in a dispute arising under Minnesota law,
the lawyer had engaged in the practice of law “in Minnesota.”326 Because
the lawyer was licensed only in Colorado, the court upheld the
admonition imposed by the disciplinary panel.327 One dissenting judge
would have interpreted state law to find representation to be
“reasonably related” to the lawyer’s Colorado practice and therefore
allowed under Minnesota law.328 Neither the majority nor the dissent
grappled with the constitutionality of restricting cross-border speech.
The question of cross-border practice was also raised in Ohio when
Kentucky-licensed attorney Alice Auclair Jones applied for admission to
the Ohio bar. Jones originally lived, worked, and was licensed in
Kentucky. She worked for a firm that had offices in both Kentucky and
Cincinnati. After getting married, she moved to Cincinnati where she
continued to work for the firm representing her Kentucky-based clients
while she applied for admission to the Ohio bar.329 Jones was careful to
work exclusively on matters “before Kentucky tribunals arising under
Kentucky law” and avoid working on any matters arising under Ohio
law, affecting Ohio clients, or coming before Ohio courts.330 She did not
hold herself out as an Ohio-licensed attorney, and continued to use
letterhead with contact information for the firm’s Kentucky office.331
Nonetheless, the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Character and
Fitness recommended that her admission to the Ohio bar be denied,
concluding that her physical presence in Ohio while her application was
pending amounted to the unauthorized practice of law in Ohio.332
The matter went up to the Ohio Supreme Court with substantial
amicus participation from national law firms. The court ultimately ruled
325 In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct in Panel File No. 39302, 884 N.W.2d
661, 663 (Minn. 2016).
326 Id. at 668.
327 Id. at 669.
328 Id. at 670 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
329 Applicant’s Brief at 2, In re Jones, 123 N.E.3d 877 (Ohio 2018) (No. 2018-0496).
330 Id. at 4.
331 Id. at 5.
332 In re Jones, 123 N.E.3d at 879.
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that Jones could be admitted to practice in Ohio, holding that her preadmission presence in Ohio could be deemed “temporary” because she
had applied for admission and that the practice therefore was not
“unauthorized” under Ohio law.333 While the majority did not need to
reach the question of whether the result was constitutionally mandated,
a concurring opinion did address the constitutional issues.
The concurring justices acknowledged that technology had outpaced
regulation, stating that “before the advent of the Internet, electronic
communication, and the like, a lawyer who worked in Ohio was almost
always practicing Ohio law,” but that now it was easy for an attorney to
physically reside in the state while practicing outside of it.334 The
concurring justices would have held that the state had no interest in
regulating the legal practice of “a lawyer who is not practicing Ohio law
or appearing in Ohio courts.”335 The concurring justices pointed to
instances in which lawyers might practice across a state border but
maintain “a secondary office inside their homes so that they can access
their files remotely” or might live and practice elsewhere but keep an
“Ohio vacation home on Lake Erie” in which they spend summers.336
Under the majority opinion, such attorneys would still be required to
seek licensure in Ohio. Under the concurring opinion, however, the
state would have no interest in regulating this practice and could not
constitutionally forbid it.
2.

One-to-Many and Many-to-Many Communication

In addition to more commonly crossing geographic boundaries, the
provision of legal advice has also expanded beyond the traditional
client-lawyer relationship. The growth of massive digital platforms has
changed the scale of communication about legal information. This has
meant that more information about legal matters is available directly to
the public even without legal representation. As Professor Robert Kry
has pointed out, “technological advances have enabled clients to access
a wealth of advice with minimal time and expense.”337 Greater
accessibility of information means both that a single expert can more
easily reach a broad audience (one-to-many communication) and that

333 Id. at 881 (“[H]er practice from Ohio pending her application is temporary
because the continuation of her practice depends on the resolution of her application.”).
334 Id. at 886 (DeWine, J., concurring).
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Kry, supra note 68, at 975.
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groups of people can more easily collaborate (crowdsourcing, or manyto-many communication).338
Both of these communication patterns have implications for the
regulation of legal practice. The ability to communicate with a large
audience fuels companies such as LegalZoom and others that provide
routine legal forms and non-specialized advice on “simple document
preparation, such as wills, incorporation documents, and name-change
petitions” to a broad audience.339 The ability to crowdsource legal
information has led to new forums popping up online, providing legal
advice for people who may not be able to afford to hire lawyers or may
not trust their own lawyer’s advice.340
Crowdsourced advice is not always good advice, of course, as
“[l]awyers who quickly dispense advice do not have time to fully
investigate the facts,” while “non-lawyers may lack information both
about the facts and the law.”341 Nonetheless, forums such as Reddit’s
r/legaladvice are increasingly active. The Reddit forum alone has over
1.4 million members and enables individuals to seek advice on matters
such as how to obtain embassy assistance in returning a minor citizen
to the United States,342 whether a tenant could be evicted for nonpayment,343 and whether a sibling’s drug addiction would provide
grounds for an individual to seek custody of the sibling’s child.344 It’s
true that crowdsourcing isn’t the best way to handle important legal
matters. But legal representation is often financially out of reach even

338 Derek E. Bambauer, The MacGuffin and the Net: Taking Internet Listeners Seriously,
90 U. COLO. L. REV. 475, 477-79 (2019) (“[T]he internet is the first widespread medium
to make communication by many speakers and many listeners — one-to-one and oneto-many, simultaneous and asynchronous — not only possible but routine . . . . [It]
makes many-to-many communication seamless.”).
339 Robertson, supra note 88, at 87.
340 Id. at 83-86.
341 Id. at 86.
342 u/MustaphaKulungu, Can I (a Minor) Use the Embassy to Get Home? (USA),
REDDIT (Dec. 31, 2020, 8:06:04 AM PST), https://www.reddit.com/r/legaladvice/
comments/knsljp/can_i_a_minor_use_the_embassy_to_get_home_usa/ [https://perma.
cc/V7RB-F29B].
343 (US CA) Can I Legally Evict My Tenant if They Did Not Use Rental Assistance Funds
to Pay Rent?, REDDIT (Dec. 31, 2020, 12:12 PM PST), https://www.reddit.com/r/
legaladvice/comments/knx4u5/us_ca_can_i_legally_evict_my_tenant_if_they_did
[https://perma.cc/9DM8-84KE].
344 u/Logical_Mix922, Update: Vermont - Can I Get Legal Custody of a Baby if I’m Not
One of the Parents? My Drug Addicted Sister Just Gave Birth, REDDIT (Dec. 30, 2020, 10:11
PM PST), https://www.reddit.com/r/legaladvice/comments/knkfw3/update_vermont_
can_i_get_legal_custody_of_a_baby/ [https://perma.cc/5FQY-M7BL].
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for relatively well-off Americans, so seeking advice online may be the
most accessible source of information about the law for many people.345
Crowdsourced advice doesn’t just cover the substance of legal
matters. Instead, it can also serve as a way of monitoring lawyer quality.
Just as online reviews have cropped up for everything from restaurants
to cookbooks, they have also become a major source of information for
individuals seeking to hire an attorney.346 Over the last twenty years,
prospective clients increasingly rely on Internet searches rather than
simply on recommendations from family and friends.347
The rise of online reviews of attorneys has created both challenges
and opportunities for lawyer regulation. The challenges arise from the
psychological dynamics at play with online reviews — lawyers who feel
threatened both personally and professionally are likely to lash out in
response, answering negative reviews defensively and sometimes
revealing confidential or privileged information in doing so.348 But the
practice also creates opportunities, as client reviews can be helpful in
monitoring attorney competence and diligence, sometimes bringing
problems to light that might otherwise have escaped disciplinary
attention.349 It is true that clients typically lack the substantive legal
knowledge that would allow them to evaluate matters of technical
competence. Nevertheless, even clients without such specialized
knowledge can still effectively evaluate non-technical matters that play
into an attorney’s competence, most importantly responsiveness,
communication, and billing practices.350 This information can play a
useful role both in helping prospective clients identify attorneys they
might (or might not) want to hire, and in helping disciplinary bodies
identify potential problems.

345

Robertson, supra note 88, at 78.
See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Online Reputation Management in Attorney
Regulation, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 106 (2016) (“While uniformly positive reviews
can help attract new clients, a single negative review — even in the midst of additional
positive ones – can drive potential clients away.”).
347 Id.
348 Id. at 113-16, 122-23.
349 Id. at 142-43 (“[I]t is easier for clients to write a review on Yelp or Yahoo than it
is to navigate the lawyer disciplinary system.”).
350 See id. at 151-52 (noting that former clients can evaluate “how responsive the
attorney was, how clearly they explained matters, and how transparent their billing
practices were”).
346
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Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Legal Practice

AI is playing an increasingly large role in legal practice just as it does
in medical practice. In some cases, the legal system is required to
grapple with the consequences and biases of AI. For example, three
individuals — all Black men — were wrongfully arrested as a result of
errors in a facial identification tool.351 Even though the cases did not
proceed to a conviction, the arrest and initial detention created
significant disruption in the lives of those wrongly accused.352
Moreover, facial identification is only the beginning. Once a person
is arrested, some local justice systems will use “an algorithm that
evaluates the defendant’s risk [of reoffending] rather than money to
determine whether a defendant can be released before trial.”353 These
algorithms are prone to bias and error. One study revealed that an
algorithm incorrectly labeled Black defendants as likely to reoffend
almost twice as frequently as it did White defendants, and it mislabeled
White defendants as low-risk more often than Black defendants.354 The
legal profession hasn’t yet established a way to address AI harm or to
systematically consider whether the benefits of algorithmic assessments
outweigh their potential hazards.
AI also plays an increasingly large role in the day-to-day practice of
law. Lawyers may not be aware of the extent to which they are
increasingly integrating AI into ordinary legal practice. One author has
explained how AI is embedded in everyday legal-research tools:
Anybody using Google for any sort of research is using one of
the world’s most advanced AI-backed tools for legal work,
whether they’re looking into an opponent’s business entities,
combing through news articles for a quote to cite, trying to find
the right government agency website for filing a form, or
351 Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facialrecognition-misidentify-jail.html [https://perma.cc/46RH-CTTR].
352 See id.
353 Id.
354 Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-riskassessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/N3QK-XLEJ]; see also Melissa
Hamilton, Debating Algorithmic Fairness, 52 UC DAVIS L. REV. 261, 264 (2019)
(reporting that the risk tool’s corporate owner denied the allegation and stated that its
reanalysis of the data led it to conclude that “the tool was unbiased as [B]lacks and
whites had similar positive predictive values for recidivism”); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias
In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2221-22 (2019) (discussing algorithmic risk
assessment in the criminal justice system and its racial impact).
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looking for a legal blog post summarizing the implications of an
obscure subsection of ERISA they’ve never heard of.355
AI may also be integrated into more specialized systems. IBM’s Ross,
for example (a version of the Watson AI platform tailored to legal
practice), garnered a great deal of attention in legal circles.356 Ross was
described as the “world’s first AI lawyer” and was added to Baker &
Hostetler’s bankruptcy practice several years ago.357
When used for legal research and information management, AI
systems can offer significant benefits by making information more easily
available. Many companies are already integrating AI into their
contract-review processes — a big task when “large enterprises will
have millions of outstanding contracts, with thousands of different
counterparties, across numerous internal divisions.”358 AI systems allow
companies to move away from a siloed approach to information and can
allow for easier access to the details of thousands of contracts at once,
facilitating comparison, standardization, and management of
contractual obligations.
Artificial intelligence also makes it easier to analyze thousands of
litigation outcomes at once and thus to predict the likely outcome of
future cases. According to one company, “its AI can predict case
outcomes with 90% accuracy.”359 The ability to predict litigation
outcomes can, in turn, improve advice to clients about whether it is
worth pushing forward with a lawsuit and how much it is worth paying
to do so. Making it easier to estimate a case’s value likewise increases
the comfort level of outside litigation funding entities and thus makes
it more likely that lawsuits will be able to attract outside funding.360
The legal system’s greater reliance on artificial intelligence will almost
certainly change the legal system in both foreseeable and unforeseeable
355 Nicholas Gaffney, How Artificial Intelligence Is Changing Law Firms and the Law,
ABA L. PRAC. TODAY (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/
artificial-intelligence-changing-law-firms-law [https://perma.cc/LP57-L9FN].
356 Bob Ambrogi, At AI Research Company ROSS, A New Stage of Transparency and
Engagement, LAWSITES (July 29, 2019), https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2019/07/at-airesearch-company-ross-a-new-stage-of-transparency-and-engagement.html [https://perma.
cc/FS38-RUR2].
357 Matthew Griffin, Meet Ross, The World’s First AI Lawyer, 311 INST. (July 11, 2016),
https://www.311institute.com/meet-ross-the-worlds-first-ai-lawyer/ [https://perma.cc/
96XC-AQ3G].
358 Rob Toews, AI Will Transform the Field of Law, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2019, 2:09 PM
EST), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robtoews/2019/12/19/ai-will-transform-the-fieldof-law/ [https://perma.cc/PVH2-BU9M].
359 Id.
360 See id.
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ways. One predictable effect is that adopting new AI systems may be
more attractive to corporate clients than to the law firms that serve
them. Most law firms, after all, bill by the hour and profit from the value
added by human analysis.361 Corporations, on the other hand, reap
significantly greater benefits from being able to synthesize legal
knowledge quickly and reduce the hours dedicated to organizing and
maintaining legal information.
New technology can be both very helpful and very flawed — thus
encouraging users to rely on it without fully understanding its
limitations. Professor Brian Sheppard has described concerns about
“skill fade” that can arise from the integration of AI systems.362 Skill fade
occurs when lawyers come to rely so heavily on computer-assisted
analysis that they cannot conduct the analysis themselves. This
phenomenon has been identified in other areas. It has been noted, for
example, that “autopilot can lead to a decline in pilot skill.”363 A fully
mature technology might be reliable enough that it won’t matter if
human skills are lost. But we are not yet at that point.
The same process is likely to play out in AI systems used in legal
practice and health care.364 Sometimes the value added outweighs the
erosion of skill so strongly that there is little net loss. Computer-aided
citation checking, for example, is both faster and more comprehensive
than old-fashioned Shepardizing with books was.365 But when skill is
lost, individuals may lack the knowledge to recognize when “out of the
loop” problems occur — that is, when problems crop up that the
underlying algorithm fails to recognize or address.366

361 See Gaffney, supra note 355 (“The main purpose of AI is to reduce the time
humans spend on tasks, but the business model of most law firms depends on billing as
much human time as possible to clients . . . .”).
362 Brian Sheppard, Skill Fade: The Ethics of Lawyer Dependence on Algorithms
and Technology, 19 PRAC. INNOVATIONS 1, 1 (2018), http://info.legalsolutions.
thomsonreuters.com/signup/newsletters/practice-innovations/2018-mar/article1.aspx
[https://perma.cc/WDS6-V2UR] [hereinafter Skill Fade].
363 Id. at 3.
364 See Claudia E. Haupt, Artificial Professional Advice, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 55, 71
(2019) (“Based on big data inputs, the characteristic of machine learning is
accumulation of information that then generates opaque outputs the professional may
incorporate into advice without understanding how exactly they were generated.”).
365 In re Liquidation of Azstar Cas. Co., 938 P.2d 76, 78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)
(allowing the recovery of funds spent on computerized cite-checking because “such
tasks can more quickly and accurately be done by computer”).
366 See Alan Wolf & Lynn Wishart, Shepard’s and Keycite Are Flawed (or Maybe It’s
You), 75 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 24, 25 (2003) (explaining that computer-assisted citation
checking went through a period where this was a significant problem, as online citators
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Skill fade and out-of-the-loop problems are likely to occur when
technological ability outstrips its reliability. Computerized systems are
growing increasingly able to augment or replace legal work, but this
growth is currently uneven, resulting in “incomplete innovation.”367
This uneven development creates a risk that individuals will be tempted
to over-rely on algorithmic analysis before it has progressed to a point
where it is reliable enough to substitute for human judgment.368 The
benefits of AI-assisted legal analysis are so strong that there is little
doubt their role will expand. As the legal system’s reliance on
algorithms grows, it becomes increasingly important to “adopt
approaches that preserve our ability and motivation to monitor and
assess the justice system itself.”369
IV. RETHINKING REGULATION AT SCALE
Professional regulation in the twenty-first century faces two
converging trends. First, the Supreme Court has adopted stricter
control on the regulation of speech, limiting the scope and structure of
professional regulatory authority. Second, the growth of massive digital
platforms and technological innovations are re-shaping both law and
health care, giving rise to new regulatory challenges. This creates
difficulty for state regulatory authorities, because the new Supreme
Court jurisprudence seems to limit their power just as new problems
emerge and need attention.
But even if the convergence of these trends creates a certain amount
of difficulty, it also creates new opportunities for creative regulation
that safeguards constitutional rights. As scholar David Han has pointed
out, “[t]echnological change plays a vital role in the evolution and

failed to pick up situations where the holding of one case was overruled by another that
did not specifically mention the first); Sheppard, Skill Fade, supra note 362, at 3.
367 See Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the Premature Disruption of Legal
Services, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797, 1807-08 [hereinafter Incomplete Innovation].
368 See id. at 1808 (noting that earlier suggestions that computer analysis could never
replace legal work were made before it was every contemplated “that a machine could
beat the very best human opponents in chess, that video games could procedurally
generate virtual cities, or that a concealed iPhone can make anyone appear to be an
unbeatable trivia expert on Shakespeare”).
369 Sheppard, Skill Fade, supra note 362, at 4; see also Alyson Carrel, Legal Intelligence
Through Artificial Intelligence Requires Emotional Intelligence: A New Competency Model
for the 21st Century Legal Professional, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1153, 1161 (2019) (“Lawyers
must understand the underlying technology enough to ask the right questions and to
ensure that data and technology are being used appropriately, ethically, and with an
appreciation of the impact on society and clients.”).
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development of constitutional rights doctrine.”370 He argues that “the
destabilizing force of technological change on constitutional rights
doctrine ultimately serves as a valuable opportunity for courts to
reevaluate, in a deep and meaningful manner, the fundamental
theoretical, intuitional, and empirical judgments that underlie the
existing doctrinal framework.”371
This Part examines what such reevaluation might look like for
professional regulation in law and in health care. If regulators can no
longer rely primarily on speech-restrictive regulatory approaches, what
can they do instead? The crux of our argument is that incremental
change in the traditional state regulatory process is insufficient to meet
the challenges posed by changes in technological scale. Instead, it is
time to ask the bigger questions about the underlying goals and first
principles of professional regulation. We propose three areas of reform
that account for changes in both the scale of professional speech and
jurisprudential limits on regulation: 1) letting go of obsolete regulatory
approaches, 2) increasing government speech, and 3) coordinating
beyond borders.
A. Letting Go of Obsolete Regulatory Approaches
The first area of reform is to jettison regulatory approaches that no
longer play a role in protecting the public’s well-being. Scholars have
noted the presence of “regulatory inertia,” which “can be hard to break
without an external shock, usually a tragedy or massive failure that
reignites interest in regulation.”372 The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020
provided such an external shock, and both law and medicine were quick
to respond in ways that swiftly integrated technology and removed
protectionist barriers.
As a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, federal and state regulators
further relaxed several rules in order to encourage doctors to offer
telemedicine rather than in-person patient appointments.373 These
nimble responses to the pandemic illustrate the potential for regulatory
flexibility. Examples of temporary measures that government
authorities implemented in 2020 include:

370 David S. Han, Constitutional Rights and Technological Change, 54 UC DAVIS L. REV.
71, 130 (2020).
371 Id.
372 Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 227
(2014).
373 Carmel Shachar, Jaclyn Engel & Glyn Elwyn, Implications for Telehealth in a
Postpandemic Future: Regulatory and Privacy Issues, 323 JAMA 2375, 2375-76 (2020).
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•

Some states loosened or eliminated particular licensing
requirements so that clinicians could serve patients in other states
without obtaining additional licenses.374

•

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) issued
waivers that eliminated barriers to telemedicine use for Medicare
patients.375 These waivers expanded the types of eligible
practitioners and allowed audio-only services.376

•

CMS announced a temporary payment parity program for
Medicare by which clinicians could be paid equally for
telemedicine and in-person visits.377

•

Some states relaxed their Medicaid requirements.378 These
policies include expanding the categories of clinicians that can be
reimbursed for telemedicine visits and paying for telemedicine
treatment of new patients that did not previously have an inperson visit.379

Regulations affecting the practice of law were also loosened in
response to the pandemic. For the first time in its 231-year history, the

374 Id. at 2376; FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., U.S. STATES AND TERRITORIES MODIFYING
REQUIREMENTS FOR TELEHEALTH IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 1-28 (2021),
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/pdf/states-waiving-licensure-requirementsfor-telehealth-in-response-to-covid-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS7V-JYB4].
375 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., COVID-19 EMERGENCY DECLARATION
BLANKET WAIVERS FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 1-37 (2021), https://www.cms.gov/
files/document/summary-covid-19-emergency-declaration-waivers.pdf [https://perma.
cc/M68U-9LCL].
376 Id. at 1; see also Shannon Britton Hartsfield & Robert Hill, 10 Post-Pandemic
Regulatory Considerations for Telehealth Providers, JDSUPRA (May 5, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/10-post-pandemic-regulatory-80609/ [https://perma.
cc/P2YQ-8573].
377 COVID-19 Telehealth Coverage Policies, CCHP (Mar. 2021), https://www.cchpca.
org/resources/covid-19-telehealth-coverage-policies [https://perma.cc/4ZA2-GGSV].
378 Hartsfield & Hill, supra note 376.
379 Id.; WASH. STATE HEALTH CARE AUTH., APPLE HEALTH (MEDICAID) TELEHEALTH
REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL, OCCUPATIONAL AND SPEECH THERAPY DURING COVID-19
PANDEMIC 3 (2020), https://www.hca.wa.gov/assets/billers-and-providers/physicaloccupational-speech-therapy-guidance-COVID-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU7H-BZ23];
Telemedicine – Provider Information: COVID-19 State of Emergency Changes to
Telemedicine Services, CO. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE POL’Y & FIN.,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/hcpf/provider-telemedicine (last visited Dec. 29,
2020) [https://perma.cc/J5C9-9U7K].
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Supreme Court heard oral arguments remotely.380 Other courts held
video hearings and even experimented with jury trials by video
conference.381 Law firms allowed lawyers to work out of their homes,
increasing pressure on state regulators to acknowledge that “remote
working” should be “outside the purview” of unauthorized practice
restrictions.382 Difficulties in holding an in-person bar examination also
caused some states to relax initial licensing restrictions and increased
support for diploma privilege.383
Regulatory policies that were liberalized for the pandemic should be
re-evaluated when the pandemic is over. Not every change needs to be
made permanent, but innovations and technological advances that were
borne out of necessity might suggest areas in which older restrictions
have outlived their value.
B. Increasing Government Speech
In addition to abandoning outdated policies, professional regulatory
entities should become more vocal advocates in areas where their
actions can have the greatest public benefit. The Supreme Court has
hinted that government entities should consider ramping up efforts to
engage in their own communication. In Sorrell, for example, the
Supreme Court suggested that if Vermont was “displeased that detailers
who use prescriber-identifying information are effective in promoting
brand-name drugs,” then it could “express that view through its own
speech.”384
Governmental speech can reflect regulatory policy directly, without
going through licensed professionals as intermediaries. It therefore
allows regulatory entities to engage in “complete editorial control.”385
Such editorial control may be especially useful in combatting problems
380 Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Arguments Resume — But with a Twist, NPR (May
4, 2020, 5:01 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/04/847785015/supreme-courtarguments-resume-but-with-a-twist [https://perma.cc/KSP2-69KG].
381 Angela Morris, Lessons Learned, ‘History Made’ in First Zoom Jury Trial in a
Criminal Case, TEX. LAW. (Aug. 11, 2020, 9:31 PM), https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/
2020/08/11/lessons-learned-history-made-in-nations-first-zoom-trial/ [https://perma.
cc/74CK-QSWZ].
382 Anthony E. Davis, J. Richard Supple Jr., Nataniel Arabov & Janis M. Meyer,
Lawyers’ Risk Management Newsletter, September 2020, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 29, 2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=24183982-af05-4112-8d02-f63619dee
7659 [https://perma.cc/T3PX-VZDP].
383 Robertson, supra note 191, at 1295.
384 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 578 (2011).
385 Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First Amendment, 25
J.L. & POL’Y 63, 121 (2016).
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of misinformation shared online. Social media has enabled attorneys
and medical practitioners to reach international audiences, sometimes
disseminating conspiracy theories and other pernicious information.386
Medical and legal professionals often have outsized influence because
they appear to be credible experts,387 and thus their falsehoods can do
great harm.
Regulating professional speech is challenging in light of First
Amendment concerns.388 States have developed different approaches to
disciplining physicians for misleading speech, though some of the
policies may be vulnerable to First Amendment challenges. California’s
Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders and Disciplinary Guidelines,
establishes penalties for dishonesty that is “substantially related to the
qualifications, function or duties of a physician and surgeon but not
arising from or occurring during patient care, treatment, management
or billing.”389 This would presumably encompass statements made on
social media. The minimum penalty for such misconduct is “stayed
revocation, 5 years probation” and the maximum penalty is license
revocation.390 Minnesota may discipline physicians even more broadly
for “any unethical or improper conduct,” including conduct likely to
“deceive or defraud the public.”391 Disciplinary measures can include
license revocation or suspension, revocation or suspension of
registration to conduct interstate telemedicine, placement of limitations
or conditions on a physician’s practice, civil penalties of up to $10,000
per violation, and more.392 By contrast, Texas does not include
dishonesty or spreading false information to the public as acts subject
to discipline by the state medical board.393
It is possible that restrictive disciplinary policies would survive the
Supreme Court’s application of heightened review. To prevail, the state
would have to develop a strong evidentiary record of the harms caused
386

See supra Part III.A.3.
Abby Ohlheiser, Doctors Are Now Social-Media Influencers. They Aren’t All Ready
for It., MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 26, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/
04/26/1000602/covid-coronavirus-doctors-tiktok-youtube-misinformation-pandemic/
[https://perma.cc/2D4N-4S3X] (“Their medical credentials give their thoughts on the
virus added weight.”).
388 See supra Part II.
389 MED. BD. OF CAL., MANUAL OF MODEL DISCIPLINARY ORDERS AND DISCIPLINARY
GUIDELINES 24 (2016), https://www.mbc.ca.gov/Download/Documents/disciplinaryguidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K6K-R7U4].
390 Id.
391 MINN. STAT. § 147.091(g) (2020).
392 MINN. STAT. § 147.141 (2020).
393 See 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 190.8 (2021).
387
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by the false statements as well as the lack of a narrower way to combat
those harms.394 In addition, the state would bear the burden of proving
falsity — a difficult proposition when it comes to professional speech,
as professional opinion may differ in areas without scientific consensus.
Nevertheless, because of the reach and impact of social media, state
boards should not turn a blind eye to legal and medical professionals’
misconduct through these platforms. When the government can
develop proof of direct harm from false speech, it can sustain
professional discipline even under Alvarez.395 The adoption of an
intermediate-scrutiny standard for professional speech — a possibility
left open by NIFLA — would increase the likelihood that states could
develop an evidentiary record sufficient to discipline professionals who
disseminate false information likely to cause harm.396 But when creating
an adequate evidentiary record is challenging, it may be easier for
government entities to let their own voices be heard in order to counter
falsehoods.
The government can engage in direct public education, can publicize
areas of scientific agreement, and can communicate its own
viewpoint.397 The Supreme Court’s case law has been largely protective
both of individual speech and of governmental speech.398 When the
government regulates others’ speech, content-based restrictions are
judged by heightened scrutiny.399 But when the government itself is the
speaker, heightened scrutiny does not apply.400
394

See supra notes 205–211 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 205–211 and accompanying text.
396 See Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, 97 N.C. L. REV. 843, 883
(2019) (“[I]ntermediate scrutiny adequately protects physicians’ and patients’ interest
in open medical communications. At the same time, unlike strict scrutiny, the standard
is not so demanding that it would preclude legitimate regulatory efforts to uphold
professional quality.”).
397 See Helen Norton, Government Speech in Transition, 57 S.D. L. REV. 421, 421
(2012) (“Not only must government speak if it is to govern, its speech is often quite
valuable to the public. For example, government speech both informs members of the
public on a wide range of topics and enables them to identify their government’s
priorities (and thus to evaluate its performance.)” (footnote omitted)).
398 See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2474 (2018) (distinguishing speech of public employers (which may qualify as
government speech) and public-agency unions (whose speech is not controlled by the
employing agency)); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005)
(holding that regulatory assessments used to fund “the Government’s own speech” are
not subject to challenge under the First Amendment).
399 See NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018); supra Part I.B.
400 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 557 (considering “the First Amendment consequences of
government-compelled subsidy of the government’s own speech”).
395
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To the extent that regulatory entities are concerned about the
dissemination of false speech online (and they should be concerned
about it), the best course of action might be for regulatory entities to
engage in their own efforts at public education rather than feeling
bound to maintain neutrality even when it contradicts professional
consensus. Indeed, during the COVID-19 epidemic government speech
became a vital public health tool. Messaging about the importance of
wearing masks and social distancing was ever-present and
indispensable in the face of dangerous conspiracy theories and
irresponsible risk-taking.401
C. Coordinating Beyond Borders
Finally, just as legal practice and health care have expanded beyond
traditional borders, so too must regulatory authority. This requires
looking beyond mere state-based professional licensing. Regulatory
policy might cross state or even national borders. But regulatory
coordination might also cross more theoretical boundaries, bringing
together different professional disciplines or engaging in creative
public-private partnerships.
1.

Coordination of Professional Disciplines

As this article has shown, there is a great deal of similarity in the
regulatory challenges faced by different professions. Especially when it
comes to the challenges posed by technological innovation, regulatory
authorities should work together to identify areas of common concern.
The growth of artificial intelligence, for example, raises concerns that
are not unique to any particular discipline — issues of racial or gender
bias in algorithms, skill fade, and out-of-the-loop problems exist
wherever AI is implemented. Government entities should set up
regulatory structures that provide input from law, medicine, and other
professions and allow cross-disciplinary coordination to develop best
practices for integrating and optimizing emerging technologies.

401 See, e.g., How to Protect Yourself & Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Nov. 29, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/preventgetting-sick/social-distancing.html [https://perma.cc/EKC8-J6FM] (“Stay 6 feet away
from others.”); Masks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 21, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/diy-cloth-facecoverings.html [https://perma.cc/N5AK-LERY] (“Your guide to masks.”).
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Public-Private Collaboration

Many of the “regulation at scale” issues in professional regulation
arise from the widespread influence of massive digital platforms. When
possible, governmental authorities should collaborate with these
platforms and integrate them into regulatory policies. Thus, for
example, online review sites have created new regulatory challenges,
especially when professionals seek to respond to negative reviews
online, but they also offer additional information, giving regulatory
authorities a limited window to client and patient concerns.402
Professional regulatory bodies should seek to work with the larger
platforms and internet intermediaries. The private entities may welcome
assistance in developing content moderation guidelines and might also
offer a forum for government speech that educates the public about
professional standards and regulatory procedures.403
3.

Geographic Flexibility

Technology enables attorneys and medical clinicians to practice on a
national scale through telemedicine and online legal practice.404
Consequently, it makes little sense to continue to regulate attorneys and
physicians exclusively on a state-by-state basis. Moreover, facilitating
the practice of law and medicine across state borders would enhance
underserved populations’ access to health care and legal assistance.
Individuals who live in rural areas with few lawyers or medical
specialists could obtain the services of highly skilled professionals by
electronic means without the cost of travel. As noted above, regulators
have already removed barriers to a more national practice of
telemedicine.405 States have established mechanisms of special licenses
or compacts to facilitate interstate licensure.406
Long before COVID-19, advocates called for full reciprocity of state
medical licenses, not just for purposes of telemedicine. For example, in
2014 the prominent Health Affairs Blog published a piece arguing that
“states should adopt mutual recognition agreements in which they
402 See Robertson, Online Reputation Management, supra note 346, at 146 (explaining
that even though online reviews are not always reliable, they still provide value to
regulatory entities and that efforts to coordinate on moderation policies would offer
benefit to both parties, as “quality-control mechanisms to improve reliability do have
marketing value to online review sites”).
403 See id.
404 See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
405 See supra notes 205–211 and accompanying text.
406 See supra notes 205–211 and accompanying text.
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honor each other’s physician licenses.”407 Calls for a permanent change
have gained momentum during the current pandemic.408 Physicians
have argued that state licensure restrictions defy logic because human
anatomy is the same everywhere on the planet and medical training is
regulated at a national level.409 Moreover, COVID-19 has shown that
licensure barriers can deprive patients of desperately needed care and
cost lives.410 In the coming months and years, regulatory authorities
should carefully evaluate the benefits and shortcomings of state-by-state
licensure requirements with an eye to determining the extent to which
they can be further relaxed.
When it comes to the practice of law, states have made concerted
efforts to coordinate their licensing practices. A majority of states now
offer the Uniform Bar Exam, replacing the prior patchwork of exam
coverage and practices.411 This is a good first step, but more is needed.
In law, as in medicine, overly broad state prohibitions on unauthorized
practice have inhibited practice flexibility and client access.
Coordinating policy between the states could help avoid regulatory
overreach, allowing states to focus on areas of real importance. The
states should build on earlier coordination that led to the adoption of
the Uniform Bar Exam and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.412
The Model Rules already provide some guidance for what kinds of
conduct will fall under each jurisdiction’s regulatory authority.413 The
states should take this coordination a step further, adopting uniform
rules to protect lawyers’ ability to live in one state while practicing law
in another. They should also establish national norms that define the
“practice of law” in a way that protects the rights of non-lawyers and
407

Kocher, supra note 124.
In response to COVID-19, state authorities have modified overall licensure
requirements to enable physicians to provide in-person care across state lines as well as
telemedicine. See FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 374, at 1-20.
409 See Amr H. Sawalha, Medical Licensure: It Is Time to Eliminate Practice Borders
Within the United States, 133 AM. J. MED. 1120, 1120 (2020).
410 Marcel Brus-Ramer, Coronavirus Highlights Why America Needs a National
Medical License, KEVINMD.COM (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/
2020/04/coronavirus-highlights-why-america-needs-a-national-medical-license.html
[https://perma.cc/LRQ5-Q3RG].
411 Uniform Bar Examination, NCBE, https://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube/ (last visited
Jan. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/995A-24YX].
412 See Karen Sloan, Uniform Bar Exam Gains Major Traction Across the Country,
LAW.COM (June 27, 2018), https://www.law.com/2018/06/27/uniform-bar-exam-gainsmajor-traction-across-the-country/?slreturn=20210015142111 [https://perma.cc/2TB3Q8K3] (“The Uniform Bar Exam has transformed over the past eight years from an idea
to a major force changing the way lawyers get admitted to practice.”).
413 Id.; see MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2022).
408
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lawyers licensed outside the state to engage in speech about legal
matters.414
CONCLUSION
Regulatory bodies are facing new challenges in enforcing standards of
care and providing professional oversight. The Supreme Court has
grown increasingly protective of professionals’ free speech rights and
has thereby limited the government’s power to engage in traditional
regulatory activities that might limit professional speech. At the same
time, technological developments, including the growth of massive
digital platforms and the introduction of artificial intelligence programs,
create brand new regulatory challenges. The convergence of these two
trends means that incremental change in the traditional state regulatory
process will be ineffectual. We propose three primary pathways for
reform: (1) abandoning obsolete regulatory approaches; (2) engaging in
direct government speech to counter the growth of misinformation; and
(3) most importantly, coordinating beyond traditional borders — that
is, breaking down disciplinary separations, coordinating public and
private enterprises, and moving toward more national oversight. Only
by asking the bigger questions about the underlying goals and first
principles of professional regulation can the government rise to the
challenges posed by technological development in a way that preserves
professionals’ free-speech rights.

414 See In re Jones, 123 N.E.3d 877, 886 (Ohio 2018) (DeWine, J., concurring)
(explaining that the states have little interest in regulating the legal practice of lawyers
who are exclusively providing services to out-of-state clients in matters pending in outof-state courts); see also supra Parts II.A, IV.A.

